Can you quote donald duck?: Intellectual property in cyberculture by Johnson, Peter
 
 
 
 
 
*451 CAN YOU QUOTE DONALD DUCK?: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CYBERCULTURE 
 
Peter Johnson [FNa1] 
 
Rosemary j. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Authorship, Appropriation, and the 
Law. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998. Pp. xi, 462. $19.95. 
Resumen:  
En su libro llamado “ The cultural Life of  Intellectual Properties”, la profesora Rosemary  J. Coombe 
examina la tensión existente entre los que  protegen los símbolos corporativos y  la sociedad. 
En su juicio sobre Coombe, el profesor  Peter Jonson encuentra que tensiones semejantes se 
presentan entre la propiedad intelectual de las corporaciones y la oferta sin restricciones que 
presenta Internet, donde nuevas modalidades de infracciones aparecen en forma de 
“cibersquatting, metatags y gripes”. 
El profesor Jonson, se abre a la posibilidad  de que la Web pueda ser el aire fresco que la cultura 
postmoderna  necesita para relajar el control centralizado -en exceso- de las imágenes populares.  
Abstract: 
In her book “The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties”, Professor Rosemary J. Coombe examines 
the tension between protectors of corporate “commodity / signs” and society. In his review of Prof. 
Coombe, prof. Peter Johnson  finds similar tension arising between corporate intellectual property 
and the “carnival” of the Internet, where new forms of infringement arise in the form of 
cybersquatting, metatags and gripe sites.  Prof. Johnson speculates that “the web might be just  the 
fresh air that postmodern culture needs to loosen centralized control of popular images”. 
Introduction 
Rosemary J. Coombe's The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Authorship, Appropriation, and 
the Law begins with the author, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Toronto, walking 
down Queen Street in Toronto, navigating a maze of intellectual property. She buys coffee at 
Starbucks®; sees billboards for Black Label® beer; T-shirts with *452 My Favorite MartianTM and 
Mattel's Hot Wheels®, bottles of Clearly Canadian® water and packages of Land-O-Lakes® 
margarine adorned with its trademark Indian princess; and passes a McDonald's®, which features a 
Disney Magic Kingdom® tie- in to a (copyrighted) movie called The Indian in the Closet. [FN1] 
She also meets the counterculture of intellectual property, including a shoulder bag proclaiming its 
wearer "Armed and Hammered," posters for the Nancy Sinatras (a lesbian band), a jacket patch of 
Colonel Sanders overlaid with a skull-and-crossbones, and unlicensed T-shirts featuring 
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copyrighted Picasso paintings. On this walk, which reflects any short walk down any city street by 
any reasonably attentive observer, Coombe observes, "I have considered at least thirty-four legally 
protected cultural texts, run into about a dozen potential intellectual property infringements, and 
encountered a score of other intellectual properties I didn't reflect upon." [FN2] 
In The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties, Coombe expands upon her encounters on this Queen 
Street walk. Her central theme is the tension between "authors" and "alters." "Authors" are creators 
of privately-owned "commodity/signs," as she designates trademarks and other intellectual property 
tokens. [FN3] "Alters," on the other hand, are individuals and groups who turn the corporately-
"authored" symbols to their own uses. The products of "authors" include "advertising, lyrics, brand 
names, corporate logos, slogans, indicia of government and celebrity images." [FN4] These 
"pictures, texts, motifs, labels, logos, trade names, designs, tunes, and even some colors and 
scents are governed, if not controlled, by regimes of intellectual property." [FN5] For instance, 
intellectual property law gives Church & Dwight Co. the rights to "Arm & Hammer" as the symbol's 
author, and Kentucky Fried Chicken "owns" the Colonel's image. The products of "alters" include 
such parodies as "Armed and Hammered" and the Colonel behind a skull-and-crossbones. 
According to intellectual property law, the alters' uses infringe or dilute the authored images if not 
saved by a defense such as fair use. 
In Coombe's analysis, societies are composed of sub-societies and subcultures who communicate 
in ways the dominant culture cannot predict or control, and whose vocabulary consists partly of the 
symbols that the dominant culture has authored. These subcultures often apply to the symbols 
various meanings that the dominant culture does not intend, cannot control, and does not like. As 
Coombe observes, "[T]he social *453 deployment of texts always confounds the anticipations of 
their authors: the connotations of commodified form exceed those imagined in their inception." 
[FN6] In medieval times, this tension spawned a carnivalesque subculture of secular uses of sacred 
symbols that was largely accommodated by the Church. In today's postmodern culture, this tension 
often puts corporate symbols at odds with "the sounds in the kitchen, the noises in the home, and 
the signs and styles on the street" [FN7] and the unpredictable and parodic world of society's alters, 
with their "T-shirts and bumper stickers, billboards, newspaper debates, product labels, neon signs, 
label buttons, and cartoon figures." [FN8] 
Such subcultural "alterity" emerges in fascinating forms. Some of Coombe's chapters describe 
subcultures that have adopted commodity/signs and given them cultural significance far removed 
from the corporate author's preferred connotation. Some examples:  
• An international network of Star Trek fans, predominantly composed of heterosexual women, have 
produced and circulated a fanzine based on the Star Trek characters. "Star Trek episodes and 
characters are revised and reworked and new texts are authored," in which female themes are 
acted out and "issues of gender roles, sexuality, and the tension between family obligations and 
professional ambition are explored." [FN9] In other fanzine groups that feature "Slash" fiction, 
"women write erotic stories and draw illustrations depicting a love relationship between Kirk and 
Spock (erotic fiction is also written about the Starsky and Hutch, Blake's 7, The Man From 
U.N.C.L.E., Miami Vice, and The Professionals characters)." [FN10] 
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• For most of the 1980s, rumors linked the Procter & Gamble man-in-the-moon logo to Satanism. 
People claimed that it contained the satanic numerals "666" and that the chairman of the company 
had publicly linked its success to the devil. The company logged twelve to fifteen thousand calls 
each month asking about the rumor. Despite millions spent on investigations, Proctor & Gamble 
was unable either to tie the rumor to a competitor or to eradicate it and eventually abandoned the 
134-year-old symbol. [FN11] 
• Rumor campaigns have linked numerous companies with the Ku Klux Klan, accusing them of 
tainting their products in order to kill or sterilize blacks. These include Church's Fried Chicken, 
Troop clothing, Reebok shoes, Kool cigarettes and the Brooklyn Bottling *454 Company. [FN12] It 
was said that if you tore open the Marlboro pack in a particular way, "there would be revealed the 
head of a hooded klansman, with two spots, in Black and gold, standing for eyeholes. . . . Marlboro . 
. . stopped using the two spots on their boxes." [FN13] 
• The gay community has adopted the androgynous images of Bette Davis, Greta Garbo, Marlene 
Dietrich, Mae West and, particularly, Judy Garland. "[T]he Stonewall riots in New York (which 
inaugurated a new gay political praxis and a rejection of camp) took place on the evening of 
Garland's funeral" in 1969. [FN14] Less well documented is the lesbian community's adoption of 
Nancy Sinatra and Dolly Parton. [FN15] 
• Despite the efforts of Elvis Presley's estate to control the exploitation of Presley's image, [FN16] 
"Elvis impersonators and fans [have] create[d] an ever-evolving Elvis folklore" that they consider far 
more echt than the mass- media version perpetuated by the authorized legatees. [FN17] They 
argue that his is a celebrity image "so deeply embedded in the North American psyche and cultural 
subconscious that [it] should not be subject to control by the parochial interests of the celebrity's 
estate and assigns." [FN18] 
Coombe's strongest passages and chapters are those that detail these alternative uses in virtually 
anthropological terms, observing the phenomena of alterity without necessarily coming to any 
judgments about it. When she does make judgments, many of her pronouncements are dead-on. In 
the area of celebrity names, for instance, she is particularly astute, examining how the so-called 
"right of publicity" has expanded so that virtually every mention of a celebrity's name carries a threat 
of illegality. 
There are, however, instances where Coombe's brush paints too broadly. While it is true that, in 
many instances, the hand of corporate America has slapped down alternative uses of 
commodity/signs and sought to ensure that the associations in the public mind with its signs are 
universally favorable, not all alternative uses of commodity/signs have met with corporate or legal 
disfavor. Many of the alternative uses that Coombe writes about have gone unhindered and even 
undisturbed. For example, the network of feminist Star Trek's rewriters and recoders seems *455 to 
have flourished happily without attracting anything but slightly bemused notice from Star Trek actors 
and other creators. [FN19] This benign neglect is in keeping with the way Star Trek has become a 
folklore phenomenon, spawning Trekkie clubs, conventions, and chatrooms without needing the 
approval--or risking the wrath--of Star Trek's authors. Similarly, the rumors that have sprung up 
around trademarks like Marlboro and Procter & Gamble have proved legally unattackable, largely 
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because no individual or group perpetrators can be found. The rumors arise seemingly from 
nowhere, spread via jungle telegraph, and disappear with equal mystery. [FN20] 
The Star Trek and trademark rumor cases demonstrate a refinement in the flourishing of alterity that 
Coombe might have examined more closely. That is, the more genuinely folkloric these alternative 
uses are, the more likely they are to survive unmolested by corporate authors--either because they 
do not know about them or because they cannot do anything about them. They are genuinely the 
product of what Peter Jaszi calls "serial collaboration," [FN21] making it impossible for corporate 
interests to target any individual alter for punishment and ensuring the survival of the alternative use 
even though any individual alter may drop out. Such spontaneous brush fires are much harder to 
stamp out than the targeted acts of corporate arson that many alternative uses embody. 
In contrast to these folkloric uses, some of the alternative uses that Coombe cites as victims of 
corporate bigfooting may deserve their fate. These proposed alternative uses more nearly approach 
straightforward commercialism than do the folkloric serial collaborations cited above. One example 
of selective enforcement that she examines is the refusal of the United States Olympic Committee 
to let the Gay Olympic Games use the word "Olympic." Congress has "granted the [United States 
Olympic] Committee exclusive rights to use the word Olympic under the Amateur Sports Act," 
[FN22] and it is certain that the Committee singled out the proposed Gay Olympic Games as an 
entity from which to withhold permission to use the name. However, although it is certainly true that 
it was specifically gay groups who were forbidden use of the name that has been allowed to straight 
groups, it is also true that the law allows such discrimination--a legally-held mark can be licensed or 
not to whomever the author chooses. Unlike the Star Trek and trademark rumor cases, in this 
situation the alters *456 were traceable, their motives were arguably commercial, and there was 
nothing remotely carnivalesque or folkloric about them. 
Coombe rightly points out the inconsistencies and confusions in the courts as to how a legally-
owned mark can be put to alternative uses. While one court allows "SPA'AM" to be used for a 
benign muppet character, [FN23] others refuse permission for "Enjoy Cocaine" [FN24] and "Mutant 
of Omaha" [FN25] on T-shirts. Another court refuses to allow a parody ad for "Michelob Oily" meant 
as a protest to the anti-environmental policies of Anheuser-Busch. [FN26] To Coombe, this seems 
to portend a trend where the law protects benign alters and punishes critics. But, on closer 
examination, no such clear pattern emerges. These disparate holdings are the inevitable result of 
courts moving beyond traditional media and sorting through the new media of "T-shirts, bumper 
stickers, billboards," etc. 
Coombe, however, is not proposing that notions of corporate authorship be extinguished entirely. 
Where some observers have seen a pervasive privatizing of the public domain through intellectual 
property law, Coombe's aim is to provoke rather than to protest. She intends her book neither as "a 
comprehensive treatise nor as a philosophical tome; it is, rather, a seriously irreverent intervention 
designed to provoke and stimulate what [she] . . . nominate[s] 'a critical cultural studies of law." ' 
[FN27] 
In her travels through the byways of commodity/signs, Coombe never encounters the Internet and 
its most accessible interface, the World Wide Web. This is both unsurprising and astonishing. It is 
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unsurprising because the book is woven from a series of articles published mostly between 1991 
and 1996 in various journals, [FN28] with only chapters six (Dialogic Democracy I: Authorship and 
Alterity in Public Spheres) and seven (Dialogic Democracy II: Alterity and Articulation in the Space 
of the Political) making their first appearances in this volume. It is astonishing because it shows how 
fast the Internet has rocketed to prominence--Coombe's major study of intellectual property and 
culture could take complete shape by 1996 and not even mention it. [FN29] 
*457 The explosion of the Internet and the Web has meant an explosion in unauthorized use of 
commodity/signs in new and innovative ways by various Web-based alters and a concomitant 
retrenchment by corporate authors in the form of trademark-related litigation and legislation. The 
Web, in Coombe's terms, is another subculture that uses corporate symbols in its own unique ways. 
Corporate authors are challenging these uses in the same ways they challenge such uses in 
traditional media. 
Although Coombe does not analyze this tension between authors and alters on the Internet, her 
book provides a framework in which to do so. In this Review, I have allowed Coombe to "provoke 
and stimulate" me into applying her "critical cultural studies of law" to the Internet. Her analysis 
raises two questions. First, how have corporate interests maintained their hold on commodity/signs 
in the World Wide Web carnival? Second, can the World Wide Web loosen corporate interests' 
continual hoarding of commodity/signs? The answers to these questions yield evidence that yet 
another postmodern culture is appropriating intellectual property and redefining it for its own uses in 
ways that corporate authors have difficulty controlling. 
I divide this Book Review into four parts. Part I summarizes Coombe's survey of intellectual property 
in postmodern culture and the tensions that arise between the authors of commodity/signs and the 
subcultural alters that seek to make alternative uses of them. In Part II, I examine the work of the 
Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin. Coombe draws upon Bakhtin's theory of a "dialogic" process 
that creates meaning in society and describes how the control of meaning by governmental or 
corporate authority can lead to social stultification and cultural paralysis. Using a Bakhtin work that 
Coombe does not cite, Rabelais and His World, [FN30] I trace the development of the carnivalesque 
spirit in the medieval world and carnivalesque uses of sacred symbols that were sanctioned by the 
Church. In Coombe's postmodern world, where commerce has replaced the Church as the primary 
source of both cultural symbols and authority, such carnival uses of corporate commodity/signs--
which arise from the same impulses as carnival uses of Church symbols--are more likely to lead to 
lawsuits than laissez-faire. 
This analysis of Bakhtin and the medieval carnival leads to Parts III and IV, which describe, 
respectively, the emergence of a new postmodern carnival of alters on the World Wide Web, and 
the backlash of corporate authors who seek to extend and strengthen their control of Internet 
intellectual property. The emerging carnival of the Web provides further evidence in support of 
Coombe's thesis. First, emerging cultures tend to *458 use the commodity/signs of the mass culture 
in new ways that corporate culture cannot foresee. Second, confronted with a new carnival of 
alterity, corporate authors will seek to control it, both by bringing private lawsuits to apply existing 
laws to the new medium and, if such laws prove inadequate to the task, by passing new laws that 
specifically extend the rights of corporate authorship to the new medium. My Conclusion is less 
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conclusive than questioning: Will intellectual property on the World Wide Web prove as susceptible 
to corporate control as in traditional media, or will the diffuse nature of the Web (like the medieval 
marketplace) prove so uncontrollable that corporate culture (like the medieval Church) will find itself 
embracing the new carnival rather than fighting it? 
I. Authors and Alters: Commodity/Signs in Postmodern Culture 
The commodity/signs of Coombe's study are "signs" because, like other words, they are arbitrary 
linguistic symbols that denote things--in the case of a trademark, the source of a product or service. 
In addition to being a sign, however, the trademark, logo, or celebrity image is also a commodity 
because, unlike most non-privately-owned words, it is a valuable property in itself. [FN31] To 
illustrate, Coombe recounts the legend of the Coca-Cola executive who, waving his hand at a Coca-
Cola sign, declared that the company could lose all its capital, plant, and other assets, but that the 
famous red-and-white script logo would still allow it "to walk into a bank and receive sufficient credit 
to replace the entire global infrastructure." [FN32] 
A corporate commodity/sign, however, retains its value only insofar as the owner can maintain the 
connection between the sign and its unique referent--in other words, control both its denotation and 
its connotations. The boundary between denotation and connotation is an elementary linguistic 
concept that becomes hard-fought terrain in intellectual property law. A trademark owner would love 
it if his trademark absorbed enough connotation to attain "secondary meaning," i.e., association with 
the trademark owner alone, "a penumbra or fringe built up around the old, primary meaning of a 
symbol," [FN33] so that every appearance of the mark conjures up a single source in consumers' 
minds. Such is the case with Black & White and a pair of scotties for alcoholic beverages, [FN34] or 
"playboy" and "playmate" for adult entertainment. [FN35] However, the *459 trademark owner does 
not want his mark to wander so far from its original source-denotation and absorb so much 
uncontrolled connotation that it becomes "genericized," as is the case with the former trademarks 
aspirin [FN36] and cellophane. [FN37] A trademark owner, in other words, wants to give its mark 
enough rope to gain secondary meaning, but not enough to hang itself through genericide. 
A trademark, however, like any other word or symbol--whatever its source-- seeks to enter society's 
common vocabulary, where it is available to pick up connotations and associations and, in many 
cases, lose touch with its original denotation. When that happens to an ordinary word, it is simply 
the natural growth of language. Who, for instance, sees the "hashish" in "assassin" anymore, or the 
insect in a computer "bug" or the bootstraps a computer pulls itself up by in "booting up" ? Such 
natural growth is the death of trademark, however. Therefore, the trademark owner seeks, with the 
aid of intellectual property law, to "establish hegemony" [FN38] over the uses to which its 
trademarks are put. 
This attempt at authorial hegemony is continually in tension with the "expressions of alterity" for 
which society needs and wants to use the same symbols. [FN39] Such alternative uses as the 
phrase "Armed and Hammered" and the image of Colonel Sanders with a skull-and-crossbones 
sometimes exist insofar as the corporate author chooses not to threaten them. Such alternative 
uses are, however, increasingly pervasive in modern consumer culture, as trademarks and brand-
names become the currency of everyday speech. We speak of a Kodak moment, an Excedrin 
headache, a cup of Sanka, a Frigidaire, a Xerox copy, Miller time, a Marlboro man. 
When a social use of a commodity/sign oversteps the corporate author's invisible boundary, 
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intellectual property law comes to the rescue. In the arena that Coombe discusses, however, that 
law seldom finds expression in terms of "isolated decisions, statutes or treatises," [FN40] but usually 
arrives in the form of a cease-and-desist letter from a corporate law department. The most famous 
example is a letter from Disney lawyers demanding that children no longer display their own 
renditions of Disney characters on the walls of their privately-owned school. [FN41] Accused of 
trademark infringement or dilution, the accused surrenders. Thus, the mere brandishing of 
intellectual property laws is usually sufficient to stop offensive uses. As Coombe observes, 
"Hegemonic power is operative *460 when threats of legal action are made as well as when they 
are actually acted upon." [FN42] 
To Coombe, the postmodern world calls into question "the continued viability of regimes of property 
and protection, freedom and speech, which privilege a conceptual apparatus appropriate to an 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century bourgeois public sphere." [FN43] This older world was 
populated by individual authors, whose work was commercially and publicly valuable, and who 
received intellectual property protection for "limited times" in order to keep them creating for the 
public good. [FN44] In the current world, by contrast, most "authors" are committees, [FN45] and 
most copyrights are held by corporations under the work-for-hire doctrine. [FN46] The purpose of 
corporate symbol-ownership is largely to sell goods. Coombe describes the postmodern world as 
one in which "[g]oods are increasingly sold by harnessing symbols," and where these symbols 
"come at us as if from nowhere--across radio waves, unseen cables, invisible microwaves, and 
laser beams, springing up in our living rooms and over our telephones, bombarding our paths and 
filling our horizons wherever we walk." [FN47] In this world, "[t]he product brand name or corporate 
trademark [is the] quintessential self-referential sign or postmodern cultural good." [FN48] 
The commodification of culture has succeeded beyond any corporate dreams, bathed in the benign 
glow of intellectual property law. As Coombe explains:  
Corporate trademarks are "friends from our childhood," "members of our extended modern family." 
We grow up with the jolly Green Giant®, Mr. Clean®, the Lucky Charms®' leprechaun, and the 
Pillsbury Doughboy. Brand names have become so ubiquitous that they provide an idiom of 
expression and resources for metaphor. With phrases like the Coca-Cola-ization of the Third World, 
the Cadillac® (or the Edsel) of stereo systems, meeting with the Birkenstock® contingent (or the 
Geritol® generation), we convey messages easily and economically. [FN49] 
The same is true of celebrity names. A life jacket is a Mae West, a free *461 ticket an Annie Oakley, 
a fastball a Linda Ronstadt (because it "blew by you")--and everyone knows what a Lewinsky is. 
As Coombe observes, the right of publicity--which protects commercial uses of celebrity names--is 
the equal of trademark law in its power to confer authorship qualities and protections onto celebrity 
names. Earlier cases located the right in a performer's possession of a unique act or talent, theft of 
which would diminish its value and his livelihood. [FN50] This rationale is similar to the 
Constitutional justification for copyright and patent protection--"to promote the progress of science 
and useful acts"--with the goal of serving the public the primary one and that of rewarding the author 
only secondary. [FN51] Other early cases followed the same rationale, compensating singer Bette 
Midler for using a knockoff sound-alike to imitate her singing Do You Want To Dance? for a car 
commercial after the singer herself had refused to do it. [FN52] A similar case awarded singer Tom 
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Waits $2.6 million for using a sound-alike, when the singer himself was well known for refusing to do 
commercials. [FN53] 
As Coombe points out, celebrity law, like trademark law, is not limited in time by the Constitution 
and so can potentially last forever. By analogy to property law, courts have found that a celebrity's 
right of publicity survives her and vests in her survivors. "Having categorized the right as property, 
some courts seem to think that they have little or no choice but to recognize its surviveability." 
[FN54] It also vests in celebrities regardless of whether they have any unique talent or not. 
Take the case of Vanna White, whose only "performance of interest to the public" is filling in the 
blanks with big letters on the Wheel of Fortune TV show. Her celebrity arose as something of a 
postmodernist joke among adolescent boys in the mid-1980s, which made her a commodity of 
some commercial value. Therefore, when Samsung advertised its VCR as a machine that would 
last into the future--and showed a blond robot changing letters on a Wheel of Fortune- type show in 
"2012 A.D."--White sued for violation of her right of publicity and won. When the Ninth *462 Circuit 
denied rehearing, Judge Alex Kozinski, in dissent, put his finger on the problem with the expansion 
of right-of- publicity law, noting that "intellectual property law is full of careful balances between 
what's set aside for the owner and what's left in the public domain for the rest of us." [FN55] For 
instance, patents and copyrights expire; facts and ideas are uncopyrightable; copyrights and 
trademarks are subject to fair use; compulsory licenses limit producers' hold on TV and music. "All 
of these diminish an intellectual property owner's rights. All let the public use something created by 
someone else." [FN56] Right of publicity law, however, allows "no fair use exception; no right to 
parody; no idea- expression dichotomy." [FN57] Instead, "advertisers [must] cope with vague claims 
of 'appropriation of identity,' claims often made by people with a wholly exaggerated sense of their 
own fame and significance." [FN58] 
Despite dissenting voices like Judge Kozinski's, the right of publicity has expanded to such an 
extent that the mere mention or calling-to-mind of a celebrity image--like a trademark--can elicit a 
letter from the celebrity's lawyer. In one case, Dustin Hoffman initially won a huge judgment (later 
reversed) against Los Angeles Magazine for its use of a computer-generated update of his Tootsie 
character wearing a "butter-colored silk gown by Richard Tyler and Ralph Lauren heels." [FN59] In 
a recent case, actors George Wendt and John Ratzenberger--who played the barflies Norm and 
Cliff on the TV show Cheers--sued the owners of an airport bar modeled on the Cheers bar for 
using a fat and a thin robot as part of the set, even though the robots bore only a passing 
resemblance to the actors, and the owners of the theme bar had obtained copyright permission to 
use the characters. [FN60] 
When rehearing in this case was denied, Judge Kozinski again dissented. Echoing Coombe and 
many authorities that she cites, he noted that "the gang at Cheers became like family to many fans." 
[FN61] Here, then, are examples of national myths being created out of TV and film characters, in a 
sort of joint venture between the actors and the audience, with the actor being the only one able to 
control the dissemination of the *463 characters from the myth. Like the corporate trademark, the 
celebrity image enters the national consciousness. 
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It should come as no surprise, then, that individuals and groups latch onto these free-floating 
symbols and use them in ways that the corporate or celebrity author often does not want. In the 
postmodern world, cultural symbols and all the detritus of previous and contemporary cultures--
whether corporately owned or not--are woven into the social fabric and up for grabs, for 
recombining, for "creative bricolage, pastiche and parody identified as a postmodern aesthetic." 
[FN62] 
More disturbing to corporate authors than mere appropriation of commodity/signs are uses that 
actually transform the meaning of the signs from their public denotations into private connotations 
for particular subcultures, "reappropriations" in which the alters "inscribe their own authorship" onto 
corporate authors' symbols. [FN63] As Camille Paglia observes, "great art is always flanked by her 
twin sisters, blasphemy and pornography." [FN64] The same is true of the lesser art of corporate 
symbols. Despite their creators' best efforts, they enter the general culture where--like other 
signifiers--they are at the mercy of alternative and often dissident uses. "The most vibrant, 
compelling, and ubiquitous of cultural signifiers--those around which marginal groups tend to 
mobilize--are often the properties of corporate others." [FN65] 
The recoding of commodity/signs, however, is not just the activity of minority or dissident groups, or 
makers of knockoff goods, "but is pervasive, in the sense that most of us are nonproducers of the 
commodified culture within which we live." [FN66] In addition to highlighting dissident uses of 
commodity/signs, Coombe points to a more ubiquitous recoding by society in general and a 
concomitant general cultural danger that results from the privatizing of corporate symbols. Ascribing 
shared meanings to symbols is the heart of culture. Therefore, allowing a corporate author to 
monopolize the connotative power of generally-available trademarks stifles something vital about 
culture itself. Intellectual property law--even the brandishing of it-- "freeze[s] the play of signification 
by legitimating authorship" and makes the corporately-authored symbol mean whatever the 
corporate author wants it to mean. [FN67] 
Coombe extends this theme by arguing that investing corporate authors *464 with complete power 
over their trademarks ignores "the contributions or interests of those others in whose lives [the 
trademark] figures." [FN68] The creation of commodity/signs and their subsequent incorporation into 
the social fabric is not a top-down process, but instead involves dialogue between the corporate 
author and the consumer alters. An image becomes successful when society adopts it and uses it to 
"talk back" to the owner--the dialogic process. There are two phases to this dialogue. The first 
phase is the initial creation of the commodity/sign. Despite the claims of marketers that focus 
groups and salesmanship create a trademark's fame, it is a fantasy to believe that corporate 
authority can predict with certainty what images society will consume and then manufacture images 
to fit the market research. More often than not, images are created and launched upon the public, to 
sink or swim willy- nilly. As department store tycoon John Wanamaker is reported to have said, half 
of advertising money is wasted--but advertisers do not know which half. 
It is equally true that, just as all the corporate planning in the world cannot guarantee a successful 
trademark, all the calculation in the world cannot create a celebrity. Actors become successful 
largely through talent, skill, and hard work; they become famous largely through popular taste and 
whim. As Coombe points out, "any number of individuals have attempted to achieve celebrity with 
diligent effort, great investment, and the utmost originality and still failed to achieve any public 
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recognition or social distinction." [FN69] Celebrity, Coombe points out, does not exist in a vacuum. 
Rather it is something that the public confers on an individual. It seems only right, then, that the 
public should have some rights in the celebrity persona whose value it has helped to create. "The 
audience makes the celebrity image the unique phenomenon that it is." [FN70] The public *465 
must adopt the trademark or the celebrity in order to give it any value at all, with the shared 
experience of the author and the public filling the empty trademark or celebrity with meaning. [FN71] 
The second phase of the trademark dialogue is transformative. Just as commodity/signs are created 
through dialogue, their meanings shift through dialogue as the commodity/sign makes its way 
through social time and space. In this second phase of the dialogue, the alters find corporate 
symbols planted or discarded throughout the culture, like Xixo, the Kalihari bushman in the film The 
Gods Must Be Crazy, who finds a Coke bottle fallen from the sky into the desert and sets off to 
return it to the gods. Other corporate trademarks leap national borders, as if equally fallen from the 
sky, to become the only links between "peoples formerly separated by language, class, ethnicity, 
religion, geography, and generation." [FN72]  
[P]ink Duracell bunnies and Flintstone® characters appear in Spanish Fiesta parades, cakes are 
baked in the image of Snoopy in Mexico, Ninja Turtles appear in the place of traditional religious 
chalk markings in Cairo just as religious icons are mass-produced in the fashion of Ninja Turtles, 
and West African youth use Hindi film characters and dialogue as a form of lingua franca. [FN73] 
This worldwide scattering of American brands, however, does not *466 necessarily mean that the 
world is becoming homogenized. Coombe doubts the "Coke bottle in the Kalihari syndrome"--the 
notion that, when Western culture intrudes onto other cultures, the native culture "ups and leaves." 
[FN74] "Too often the Adidas® T-shirt on the native was figured as the sign of tragic cultural 
decline." [FN75] This is not necessarily so, she explains:  
[T]he significance of this flow of cultural imagery is still far from clear. From a superficial 
perspective, the proliferation of Coca-Cola®, Exxon®, Barbie® dolls and the Big Mac® around the 
globe appears as a universalization and homogenization of culture. It is not inevitably the case, 
however, that these phenomena assume the same meanings in other cultures that they do in our 
own. It is surely a form of imperialist hubris (and a marketing fantasy) to believe that they do. [FN76] 
It is worth recalling that, in The Gods Must be Crazy, the Coke bottle becomes the tribe's apple of 
discord before the bushman sets out to return it. To the bushman, the Coke bottle has nothing to do 
with Coca-Cola but has assumed its own tribal meaning. In a sense, we, the consuming public, are 
all tribal bushmen, bombarded daily with commodity/signs that fall from the sky, detached from any 
meaning or content, available for us to attach any meanings to them that our various tribes find 
necessary. 
II. Authors and Alters in the Commodity/Sign Carnival 
In describing this "dialogic" process of symbol creation and transformation, Coombe draws upon the 
work of Soviet philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975), who "developed a body of philosophical 
ethics about the constitutive role of language in human life and the cultural life of democracy that he 
saw as quintessentially dialogical." [FN77] Bakhtin sees the development of meaning not as 
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descending from authority to society but as a continuing dialogue; people become acculturated and 
fully self-realized only through interaction with society, including interaction with the social signs that 
society produces. The linguistic sign is synergistic, caught in a constant struggle between the 
practical necessity of language to be static and repeatable--so that constant meanings attach to 
words--and its ability to change with *467 changing circumstances. According to Coombe, Bakhtin's 
conceptual framework "more adequately accounts for the complexities of the signifying lives of 
commodified texts protected by intellectual property laws in conditions of post-modernity [than] a 
juridical account of language that sees it as a system of rules." [FN78] 
Bakhtin deals with how people actually use words and symbols rather than imposing a normative or 
legalistic framework on how they should do so. We do not choose what language we speak or what 
vocabulary we use. We do choose, however, the connotations that attach to our words. Therefore, 
given a corporate culture that dispenses pre-packaged symbols, subcultures will make what use 
they can of them, rather than invent symbols of their own. According to Bakhtin's dynamic theory, 
the different meanings that the same sign has for different peoples at different times reflect "the 
different social positionings, interests, values, and attitudes of those who engage the sign in 
everyday life." [FN79] Trademarks, in this analysis, are no different from other words and symbols. 
"So long as the sign is part of a living language, it is continually caught up in generative processes 
of struggle." [FN80] The only places where words or signs can escape this dynamic of recodification 
is in dictionaries, which one Bakhtin scholar calls "the graveyards of language." [FN81] 
Intellectual property law seeks to remove commodity/signs from this "struggle for meaning" and to 
declare the author the victor. This creates societal frustration over people's inability to use corporate 
commodity/signs with the same freedom they use other signs and symbols. Such rigid application of 
intellectual property protection, according to Coombe, can strip us of our humanity by frustrating the 
dialogue that creates meaning. "Dialogue involves reciprocity in communication: the ability to 
respond to sign with sign. What meaning does dialogue have when we are bombarded with 
messages to which we cannot respond, signs and images whose significations cannot be 
challenged, and connotations we cannot contest?" [FN82] 
In Bakhtin's dialectic, the struggle for meaning usually pits cultural officialdom against the 
"carnivalesque" impulses of non-officialdom. Authorities seek to "arrest the inherent semantic flux of 
discourse and . . . *468 impose a rigid code of equivalences between language and reality." [FN83] 
The marketplace, on the other hand, is full of unpredictable and centrifugal forces that find 
expression in satire, parody, irony, quotation, collage, stylization, and polemic. These are parodic 
antibodies that seek to rupture from within the "grey monotonous seriousness" of official meanings. 
[FN84] One of the hallmarks of this carnival world is irony, as expressed in children's songs, satire 
magazines, fanzine writing, graffiti on billboards, bootleg T-shirts of cartoon characters smoking 
dope or having sex, or parody ads that make serious social commentary on corporate sins. 
Coombe's invocation of Bakhtin's "carnivalesque" is provocative, as is her later reference to "a 
Rabelaisian consumer carnivalesque" that she contrasts to "a univocal world of signs controlled by 
an abstract force demonized simply as Capital." [FN85] Both references conjure up another Bakhtin 
work that Coombe does not cite but might have. In Rabelais and His World, [FN86] Bakhtin gives a 
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fuller exegesis of the carnival humor of the Middle Ages and early Renaissance. It is an explanation 
to make trademark owners tremble. 
In the Middle Ages, an entire world of "humorous forms and manifestations" grew up in the shadow 
of, and was sanctioned by, the "official" ecclesiastical and feudal culture. Celebrations of a carnival 
type occupied a great deal of medieval life. Every official feast had its carnival opposite, the most 
famous of which survives in Mardi Gras. Its epitome was the "Feast of the Fools," where kings and 
clergy were ritually deposed and replaced by jugglers and jesters. In the same manner, all official 
rituals were mimicked, "such as the tribute rendered to the victors at tournaments, the transfer of 
feudal rights, or the initiation of a knight." [FN87] The "Cyprian's supper," for instance, offered "a 
carnivalesque travesty of the entire Scriptures." [FN88] There were also great numbers of "parodical 
liturgies (The Liturgy of the Drunkards, The Liturgy of the Gamblers), parodies of Gospel readings, 
of the most sacred prayers (the Lord's Prayer, the Ave Maria), of litanies, hymns, psalms, and even 
Gospel sayings. There were parodies of wills (The Pig's Will, The Will of the Ass), parodies of 
epitaphs, council decrees, etc." [FN89] 
Bakhtin calculates that many medieval cities devoted three months a *469 year or more to these 
carnival festivities, the people's "second life, organized on the basis of laughter." [FN90] Carnival 
was the underbelly of the official ecclesiastical feasts, which sanctioned the existing pattern of 
things and reinforced "the existing hierarchy, the existing religious, political, and moral values, 
norms, and prohibitions." [FN91] Carnival represented a liberation from the prevailing truth; the 
suspension of all hierarchies of rank, privilege, norms and prohibitions; an opposition to "all that was 
ready-made and completed, to all pretense at immutability." [FN92] As Bakhtin observes, carnival 
has "a characteristic logic, the peculiar logic of the 'inside out (a l'envers),' of the 'turnabout,' of a 
continual shifting from top to bottom, from front to rear, of numerous parodies and travesties, 
humiliations, profanations, comic crownings and uncrownings." [FN93] 
Of particular significance for Coombe is the way the medieval carnival spirit was permitted to 
penetrate to the very highest, most orthodox of texts and symbols. No text or symbol remained 
completely sacred. "The entire official ideology and ritual are here [in Latin parodies] shown in their 
comic aspect. Laughter penetrates the highest forms of religious cult and thought." [FN94] It was a 
bawdy, belly-laughing, gross-out humor that contrasts sharply with the orthodox "classic" literary 
tradition, the "aesthetic concept of the following age," where wit and form are supreme, and the 
rough edges of grotesque realism are rubbed smooth. [FN95] 
In the modern era, however, commerce has replaced the Church as the center of the human 
universe, and corporate logos and brand-names have replaced ecclesiastical icons as society's 
pervasive imagery. To quote Adlai Stevenson, "the supermarket is our temple and the singing 
commercial is our litany." [FN96] In contrast with medieval carnival practices that were "consecrated 
by tradition and, to a certain extent, tolerated by the Church," [FN97] modern corporations cannot 
afford to be laissez-faire about carnivalesque uses of their sacred symbols. The Church allowed 
carnival as a healthy steam-valve, a temporary escape from orthodoxy, while remaining secure in 
the knowledge that the faithful would return with their faith intact and renewed. Such uses could be 
tolerated by the Church, because of the dominance of orthodoxy, the strength of the symbols and 
texts themselves, and the knowledge that accommodating parodic uses aboveboard was preferable 
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to letting blasphemy fester underground. *470 Furthermore, carnival uses of sacred symbols were 
as ritualized as Church rituals themselves. There were also, undoubtedly, built-in limits to how far 
carnival parodies could go. Heaven and hell were real places to medieval men and women. When 
parody crossed over to blasphemy, the punishment was damnation--a hell of a price for trademark 
infringement. 
Corporate intellectual property, however, is more fragile than ecclesiastical images, in part because 
its owners lack--as yet--the power of damnation and redemption over consumers. Corporate 
symbols can less afford to yield to the carnival spirit. As shown above, a trademark left unmoored in 
the marketplace can commit genericide. [FN98] A brand that tolerates rumor and parody becomes 
the source of jokes and loses its "unique selling power," through dilution. [FN99] Therefore, apart 
from such grudging exceptions as fair use, newsworthiness, and non-commerciality, the keepers of 
corporate symbols resist the carnival tolerance of their medieval forebears. Instead, they must 
guard their trademarks more religiously than religion itself. 
The comparison of trademarks to sacred symbols is not far-fetched. [FN100] Just as the Church 
was and is able to sanctify secular objects by anointing them with holy water or applying church 
symbols to them, so trademark owners are able, through licensing and branding, to control the 
spread of their marks far and wide, stamping them on goods that have nothing to do with the goods 
and services that the trademarks originally and nominally identify. 
It was not always thus. A trademark is a symbol, like a brand name, a distinctive container, a logo, a 
style of packaging, or even a sound like the NBC chimes, that identifies the source of goods or 
services. [FN101] Originally, a trademark protected the public from mistake, confusion or deception 
about the source and quality of products. Of course, a trademark was never an assurance of quality, 
but it was supposed to give the producer an incentive to maintain quality in order to protect the 
value of the brand. [FN102] 
In the twentieth century, the original function of trademark laws was progressively inverted, moving 
away from protecting the consumer from confusion toward attributing "authorship" qualities to 
trademark creation. The legal result is to "protect from 'dilution' or 'misappropriation' the *471 
integrity of a set of positive meanings which have been 'created' by the trademark owner's 
investment." [FN103] Courts agree: "Whereas traditional trademark law sought primarily to protect 
consumers, dilution laws place more emphasis on protecting the investment of the trademark 
owners." [FN104] Now the trademark itself qualifies for protection, quite apart from any product it 
helps to identify. [FN105] Licensing a trademark creates "proprietary rights in the signs 
manufacturers use to market their goods." [FN106] Those rights persist when the signs are no 
longer attached to the goods. When a trademark is licensed, the only assurance the buyer has is 
that the trademark owner has approved somebody else's use of the mark. The result is the 
proliferation of goods adorned with trademarks that have nothing to do with the goods or services 
the trademark originally denoted. As Coombe observes,  
Our children sleep in Barney® sheets, eat off Aladdin placemats, drink liquids they know only by 
brand name from plastic cups encircled by Disney characters (protected by copyright laws and 
character merchandising agreements). . . . A child in the Philippines eats Batman cereal launched 
by Ralston Purina. Logos like Cabbage Patch Kids, Hot Wheels, and Ghostbusters mark American 
products as more desirable than local ones in a diversity of markets. [FN107] 
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As early as 1975, courts recognized a potential problem in extending trademark protection to the 
trademark itself, but went ahead anyway. In Boston Professional Hockey Association v. Dallas Cap 
& Emblem Manufacturing, Inc., [FN108] the defendant emblem company was accused of copying 
Boston Bruins emblems for people to sew on their own jackets. The court initially worried that "[t]he 
difficulty with this case stems from the fact that a reproduction of the trademark itself is being sold, 
unattached to any goods or services," [FN109] and that protecting, via trademark, "designs that 
were not copyrighted" meant they would remain forever the property of the trademark owner and 
not "eventually pass into the public domain . . . by the mere passage of time." [FN110] 
*472 The Court ultimately found that the "goods" offered for sale were, in effect, the trademark itself, 
and that defendant had applied the NHL trademarks to emblems, which it then offered for sale. This 
is tantamount to saying that, if defendant were selling an unauthorized Mickey Mouse doll, what it 
would have been guilty of is applying 100% of the Mickey Mouse characteristics to a blank doll. The 
court also neatly summarized the dichotomy between copyright and trademark law regarding 
contributions to the public domain. In copyright, an individual creates a unique design, enjoys a 
temporary monopoly over it, but at the end of the copyright term, "his creation becomes part of the 
public domain." In trademark, however, an individual plucks a word or design from the public 
domain. To the extent that word or design comes to symbolize his product or business in the public 
mind, it goes "out of the public domain [and] into the protective ambits of trademark law." [FN111] 
The court acknowledged that "our decision here may slightly tilt the trademark laws from the 
purpose of protecting the public to the protection of the business interests of plaintiffs." [FN112] In 
subsequent cases, this "tilt" has become a landslide, as commodity/signs have assumed a legally- 
protectable life of their own as free-floating signifiers that can alight wherever the trademark owner 
(and only the trademark owner) decides. [FN113] 
That such symbols are literally free-floating is proved annually by the gigantic balloons that float 
down Broadway at treetop level in Manhattan every Thanksgiving Day. Many balloons in the Macy's 
Parade are corporate trademarks, whose appearances have been bought by the sponsor for 
upwards of $200,000 (in addition to the cost of constructing the giant trademark in the first place). 
[FN114] The 1999 balloons included Met Life's Snoopy, the Honey Nut Cheerios Bee, Blue (from 
Nickelodeon's "Blue's Clues"), the Pets.com sock-puppet, [FN115] the Nesquick Bunny, and a 
Maurice Sendak Wild Thing sponsored by Bell Atlantic. In return for its investment, the trademark 
owner gets two hours of television coverage, during which its balloon may appear any number of 
times. This is a bargain compared to the cost of a commercial minute during television coverage of 
the same event. Of course the "coverage" of the "event" is not *473 coverage at all, but part of the 
show that the trademark owner buys--in addition to buying the participation of its balloon, the 
trademark owner also writes the script that celebrity "reporters" who cover the parade read as the 
trademark floats by. Thus a cherished national event can be seen, in Coombe's terms, as a parade 
of free-floating commodity/signs detached from their moorings in identifiable goods and services, 
floating down city streets and into television sets around the world as celebrities, who are paid 
because of their ability to appear spontaneous, read the nice things that the corporate owners have 
paid them to say about their intellectual property. [FN116] The only unplanned part of the event is 
when one of the trademarks literally leaves its moorings and bashes a spectator, one of the few 
times in memory where a trademark has infringed a person instead of vice versa. [FN117] 
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Corporate brand-managers have become so obsessed with controlling the landscape in which their 
brands appear that some have even sought to co-opt and sponsor negative uses of their brand-
names. In May 1999, when Nike was in the midst of sweatshop-labor scandals, its advertising 
agency offered consumer- advocate and corporate-basher Ralph Nader $25,000 to appear in a 
commercial in which he would hold up a Nike sneaker and proclaim, "Another shameless attempt by 
Nike to sell shoes." [FN118] Nader declined. [FN119] 
If the commercial "church" has co-opted the public carnival, as is evident in the Macy's 
Thanksgiving Day Parade, where is today's counter-culture carnival spirit? Bakhtin traces it in 
literature from its apotheosis in Rabelais to the twentieth century, to which it traveled in an 
underground *474 stream, surfacing now and then in the works of Cervantes, Moliere, Swift, Sterne, 
Jarry, and Brecht. Had Bakhtin written later (his Rabelais was written in 1940), he might have found 
the carnival spirit re-emerging as the dominant popular literary form of the later twentieth century, in 
Mad magazine, Monty Python, the early Saturday Night Live, the works of Mel Brooks, public 
access cable TV, Beavis and Butt-Head, and most rock concerts. He certainly would have found it 
on the Internet. 
III. A New Carnival of Alters: The World Wide 
Web 
The World Wide Web brings carnival into the twenty-first century. The Web inverts everything, 
blowing creative destruction through established hierarchies. On the Web "any person with a phone 
line can become a town crier, with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. 
Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders and news groups, the same individual can become 
a pamphleteer." [FN120] Such ease of access makes Web culture individualistic, informal, 
decentralized, and extremely resistant to authority and control. According to one source, "This 
makes it the preferred medium of dissident groups in countries around the world . . . . 'The Internet 
is profoundly disrespectful of tradition, established order and hierarchy." ' [FN121] In this it bears a 
remarkable resemblance to Bakhtin's marketplace:  
[A]ll were considered equal during carnival. Here, in the town square, a special form of free and 
familiar contact reigned among people who were usually divided by barriers of caste, property, 
profession and age. . . . This temporary suspension, both ideal and real, of hierarchical rank created 
during carnival time a special type of communication impossible in everyday life. This led to the 
creation of special forms of marketplace speech and gesture, frank and free, permitting no distance 
between those who came in contact with each other and liberating from norms of etiquette and 
decency imposed at other times. A special carnivalesque marketplace style of expression was 
formed. [FN122] 
Substitute a few words and the marketplace carnival sounds like the Web, where even Bill Gates 
will answer your e-mail. 
The Web is the perfect post-modern medium--fragmentary, non-linear, encouraging Coombe's 
collage, bricolage, and pastiche. Web searches are non- linear, composed of a piece of this and a 
piece of that. A Web surfer does not read a Web page from top to bottom or a website from 
beginning *475 to end, but rather jumps from link to link. [FN123] This has created some interesting 
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problems in trying to apply print-oriented law to Web content. For instance, in a traditional media ad, 
an overbroad or potentially false advertising claim can always be qualified by a printed disclaimer at 
the bottom of the page or screen, or by spoken text at the end of a TV or radio commercial. But 
where is the bottom of a Web page or screen? Because, unlike a TV commercial, a Web page has 
no top or bottom in the traditional sense, or any beginning or end, the Federal Trade Commission 
has recommended that any disclaimer or qualification that appears in Internet advertising contain 
scrolling and/or hyperlinking instructions to the disclaimer that are at least as "clear and 
conspicuous" as the comparable placement of such disclaimers in non-Internet advertising. [FN124] 
Other examples of the non-linear Web encountering linear law are two lawsuits brought by 
Ticketmaster, first against Microsoft [FN125] and then against tickets.com. [FN126] Both the 
Microsoft sidewalks.com site and the tickets.com site advertised musical and other cultural events 
and offered deep links to the Ticketmaster page where the tickets could be ordered. This bypassed 
the Ticketmaster home page, where numerous advertisers had bought space on Ticketmaster's 
promise that every site visitor hit the home page first. [FN127] The whole concept of forcing Web 
searchers to enter a site only through the home page imports a forced linearity into the web-shaped 
Web, like insisting that every customer enter a shopping mall by the front entrance, which would 
turn any space by the door into prime real estate. [FN128] Instead, a Web journey is like Proust's 
memory of his childhood home, a lighted staircase which leads up and up, only to his room at the 
top, leaving the rest of the house dark. 
The Internet is also anarchic, ironic, and juvenile, all of the characteristics that Coombe ascribes to 
the postmodern ethos. Even the Supreme Court has declared, "the strength of the Internet is chaos 
[and] the strength of our liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered speech" 
of the Internet. [FN129] Although its structure grew from the *476 government's Arpanet, [FN130] 
the Internet's vocabulary is that of its earliest public users--teenage technogeeks raised on Star 
Trek and Monty Python. The "victory of the nerds" on the Internet [FN131] now has an entire 
generation of grown-ups saying "spam" and "Yahoo!" without cracking a smile. They undoubtedly 
do it without hearing the Swiftian carnival echo in the word Yahoo!, the name of the lumpen 
humans, who are ruled by Apollo-like horses called Houyhnhnms, in the Fourth Book of Jonathan 
Swift's Gulliver's Travels. The Web froths with adolescent humor writ large. Spam, the cybername 
for unsolicited indiscriminate e-mail, has nothing to do with pressed meat, but derives instead from a 
Monty Python sketch where a waiter announces it as a side dish with every meal. [FN132] 
Entertainment on the Web is the mainstream inverted. Interactive Web cartoons feature "a foul-
mouthed frog in a blender" who "taunts the viewer into grinding him up" or "animated fish talking in a 
bar." Even mainstream entertainment companies, when tempted to go online, opt for "the 
sophomoric, if not downright demented." Warner Brothers, for instance, has contemplated launching 
"The God & Devil Show" where the Lord and Satan will interview dead celebrities like John Wayne 
and viewers will vote whether to send them to heaven or hell." [FN133] This is carnival humor. 
According to Coombe's analysis, then, the Web should become the locus for all sorts of recoding of 
commodity/signs. Because it lacks corporate control, the Web should reveal both the top-down 
proliferation of commodity/signs as well as the bubbling-up from below of alternative uses and 
recodifications. [FN134] In fact, a brief look at the Web bears out this claim to some degree and 
shows that the Internet, too, has become a playground for newer and jollier forms of commodity/sign 
re-invention. 
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Cybersquatting 
Among the first carnival players--the dissident alter recodifiers of Coombe's book--were the 
cybersquatters. Cybersquatting came about as *477 a result of the laissez-faire policies of Network 
Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), the company that was originally the sole registering agency for Internet 
domain names ending in .com, .net and .org. NSI's early policy allowed individuals to register as 
many names as they wanted, regardless of whether the name was a trademark, company name, or 
brand-name, and thus regardless of whether the registrant had any rights to it. Initially, this led to a 
few pioneers registering famous names, calling the trademark owner, and offering to sell the domain 
name. When such retailing proved costly, wholesalers registered hundreds, sometimes thousands, 
of combinations of famous trademarks. When the trademark owner tried to register the name and 
found it taken, the cybersquatter demanded ransom. 
Dennis Toeppen of Illinois, an early cybersquatter, registered domain names based on the 
trademarks of, among others, Air Canada, Eddie Bauer, Delta Airlines, and Panavision. Panavision, 
the movie camera company, demanded its name back, and, when Toeppen demanded $13,000, 
sued. [FN135] Toeppen at first claimed he was a video artist using the Web as his medium. To 
prove this, he pointed out that his panavision.com site was not a ruse, but had actual content--aerial 
views of Pana, Illinois. [FN136] This argument, however, had less force when it became evident that 
most of Toeppen's sites had no such ironic content--the court found that Toeppen was, in fact, in 
the "business" of selling Internet domain names and found him liable for dilution of the famous 
Panavision trademark. 
Typosquatting 
Along with the cybersquatting craze arose "typosquatting"--the practice of registering a domain 
name that is one letter away from a famous trademark, or that adds a letter or a digit, in the hope 
that fumble-fingered typists will land there. Typosquatting has a slightly different purpose from 
cybersquatting. Whereas the cybersquatter usually wants only to sell the name and to make a profit, 
many typosquatters actually own websites and use the typo sites as bridges to point to their home 
sites. Their design is to produce large numbers of accidental hits on their sites, which they can then 
show to potential advertisers as evidence of the number of eyeballs their sites attract. Thus, the 
typosquatters can profit in one of two ways: they can either sell the typosites back to the trademark 
owners or keep the typosites and use them to drive eyeballs to their own *478 sites. [FN137] 
Gripe Sites 
One of the most popular alternative uses of famous trademarks on the Internet is the "gripe site." A 
gripe site is the diametric carnival opposite of an authorized site established by the trademark 
owner. Typically, the gripe site is named "[trademark] sucks.com." For example, Bally Total Fitness 
has health clubs worldwide that it promotes on a website named Bally.com. Andrew Faber, a web 
site designer unaffiliated with Bally, created a web site called "Bally sucks," which presented the 
viewer with "Bally's mark with the word 'sucks' printed across it. Immediately under this, the web site 
states, 'Bally Total Fitness Complaints! Un-authorized." ' [FN138] Any Internet user entering "Bally" 
as a search term would be directed to the "Bally sucks" site as well as the official Bally site. Bally 
complained that Internet users directed to the "Bally sucks" site may stop their searches there and 
"may fail to continue to search for [Bally's] own home page, due to anger, frustration or the belief 
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that [Bally's] home page does not exist." [FN139] The court rejected this argument, noting that a 
user who "may want to access the official Internet site to see how Bally sells itself . . . may also 
want to be apprised of the opinions of the others about Bally," which are unlikely to be available 
elsewhere than the official Bally site. [FN140] The court thus sanctioned the carnival usage and 
proved more nimble than other courts at finding the line between commercial use and commentary. 
[FN141] Accordingly, gripe sites have flourished. A recent search counted over 13,000 active 
websites worldwide with "sucks" in the title, many of them taking the form of "[trademark] 
sucks.com." [FN142] 
*479 Metatags 
Metatags represent an even more sophisticated use of trademarks. Unlike visible domain names, 
metatags are hidden in a website's HTML code, invisible to users, but visible to search engines, 
which find the tagged site if the word or description is entered as a search term. [FN143] In Playboy 
Enterprises, Inc. v. AsiaFocus International, Inc., [FN144] the owners of a site called Asian-
playmates encoded the tags "playboy" and "playmate" in its site description, to hijack users looking 
for Playboy magazine's playboy.com site. The court held that "[t]hrough the defendants' willful 
deception, consumers have been misled into believing the Asian-playmates web site is connected, 
or somehow sponsored by, PEI." [FN145] It enjoined the conduct and awarded the plaintiff 
$3,000,000. 
Corporate owners, however, have not succeeded in expunging all metatag uses. Just as the "Bally 
sucks" court found that traditional defenses to infringement and dilution survive the transition to 
cyberspace, other courts have ruled that similar defenses apply to metatags. In Playboy Enterprises 
v. Welles, [FN146] Playboy sued Terri Welles, the magazine's 1981 "Playmate of the Year," for 
embedding "playmate" and "playboy" as metatags in her web page. Terri Welles, however, was 
telling no more than the truth--she had, in fact, been named a "playmate" of the year, which the 
court found was not just a Playboy trademark but also a "title bestowed upon particular models who 
appear in [ Playboy] magazine." [FN147] Additionally, the site included a disclaimer of any affiliation 
with Playboy, indicating that, unlike the AsiaFocus defendant, Welles "has not attempted to trick 
consumers into believing that they are viewing a Playboy-endorsed website." [FN148] 
Celebrities 
Trademark owners are not alone in seeking to prevent infringing metatags. Coombe's other group of 
commodity/sign authors--celebrities--are doing the same. For instance, celebrity skater Nancy 
Kerrigan reportedly filed suit against a website that repeated her name several dozen times in a 
metatag. The website, of course, had nothing to do with Nancy Kerrigan or skating, but sold 
pornographic photos. [FN149] 
*480 Furthermore, just as the Web has increased the ease of and opportunities for trademark 
infringement, it has also increased the likelihood that actors'--and other people's--images can be 
digitized and used in ways the actors do not approve. One such use is "virtual kidnapping," in which 
people's images are digitized and shown on the Internet "performing lewd or violent acts." [FN150] 
A more familiar use of digitization is the creation of virtual actors, or "synthespians," which allows 
dead celebrities like John Wayne to appear in beer commercials and Groucho Marx to dance with a 
19 
 
 
live actor in a soft drink commercial. Bruce Willis has reportedly given permission for Sony to 
feature a digitized version of himself, in which he will "run, jump or fire a flame-thrower at your 
command," as their "digitized star" of a video game. [FN151] 
By lumping together cybersquatting, typosquatting, and metatagging, I do not mean to suggest that 
all these alters are innocent. In many of the cases, the alters used trademarks in a straightforwardly 
commercial way in order to divert traffic meant for the trademark owner's website. This is classic 
"passing off" or "palming off" and is as actionable online as off. [FN152] As one court held, raising 
"the Internet" as a defense "is not the equivalent to a cry of 'sanctuary' upon a criminal's entry into a 
medieval church." [FN153] 
It is equally clear, however, that trademarks and celebrity images have become part of the common 
coinage of Web discourse just as they have in the off-line world. And, just as they do in the offline 
world, trademark owners are using lawsuits, or the threat of lawsuits, to "establish hegemony" 
[FN154] over their commodity/signs. As the Bally and Welles cases indicate, trademark owners are 
fully prepared to go to court and spend enormous sums to press causes of action that seem 
unwinnable. There are two reasons for this. First, because courts are new to cyberspace, a roll of 
the legal dice may just as likely turn up a court that is favorable to the trademark owner's claims as 
one that recognizes that alternative uses are subject to traditional defenses. Second, a well-
publicized lawsuit--even a losing one--can easily deter potential alternative users from using the 
trademark at all rather than go through the trouble of defending a lawsuit. This is the well-known 
"chilling effect." [FN155] Not all alters have the tenacity *481 of Bally defendant Faber or former 
Playmate Terri Welles. As one commentator noted, "an Internet page creator who wants to link to 
the Walt Disney Company's official pages or fan pages and who creates a Mickey Mouse icon for 
the hyperlink, may well receive a cease-and-desist letter from Disney's lawyers," and that may be 
enough. [FN156] 
The reported cases, where one or two famous trademarks were embedded in code, are child's play 
compared to the exuberant, Rabelaisian metatags concocted by more imaginative Netizens. It is not 
surprising that the first metatag pioneers on the Web were pornographers, society's basic alters, 
who initiated much of the initial Web skirmishing over trademark and other intellectual property law. 
[FN157] By now it has become commonplace to acknowledge that pornographic sites are at the 
cutting edge of most Internet innovations, including graphics, payment systems and profit-making. 
[FN158] Porn sites, too, were among the first to bring metatags to their apotheosis. In the summer 
of 1998, a metatag called "The Pussy List" began appearing on scores of pornographic websites:  
The Pussy List. . . The Sprite Pussy: Image is nothing. . . Taste is everything; The Snickers Pussy: 
It satisfies you; The Alkaseltzer Pussy: Pop, pop, fizz, fizz. . . Oh, what a relief it is. . .; The 
Magnavox Pussy: Smart. Very Smart; The American Express Pussy: Don't leave home without it; 
The Pringles Pussy: Once you pop, you can't stop; The M&M Pussy: Melts in your mouth, not in 
your hand; The Frosted Flakes Pussy: They're GGGRRRRRREEEEAAAAATTT!; The Lucky 
Charms Pussy: They're magically delicious; The Energizer Pussy: It keeps going and going; The 
Right Guard Pussy: Anything less is uncivilized; The Jolly Green *Giant* Pussy: self- explanatory; 
The Campbells Soup Pussy: mmm mmm good; The purple pickle Pussy: heh heh; The Kix Pussy: 
Kid tested, mother approved; The Tombstone Pussy: What would you like on your Pussy?; The 
Ragu Pussy: Comes out chunkier than the rest; The Chips Ahoy Pussy: Betcha bite a chip; The 
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Purdue Pussy: More meat, less bone; The All State Pussy: You're in good hands . . . [FN159] 
And so on, through eighty-one variants, most of which were plays on famous trademarks. 
There are several remarkable things about "The Pussy List." First, all *482 the advertising slogans 
are extremely familiar: This metatag rambles through a list of close to a hundred of them, each as 
familiar to the average American TV viewer as quotations from Psalms or Proverbs would have 
been in the Middle Ages. [FN160] Second, the length and repetition of the list are unnecessary. For 
a metatag to succeed in driving traffic to the tagged site, only single words need be listed, such as 
"Equal, Sprite, Snickers, Alka- seltzer, Magnavox . . ." Instead, the author or authors of "The Pussy 
List" used puns and free-verse. This is the sort of unbusiness-like playfulness the Web inspires. 
Most significantly, many of the alters who used "The Pussy List" had no idea that they were doing 
anything wrong--they thought that they were simply pushing the edges of the medium, using the 
popular slogans of the day. According to one site owner who used the metatag, "The Pussy List" 
was an enjoyable way of tallying how much traffic different words would bring to his site. He could 
then maximize traffic by repeating the most popular "pussies." When told that his use of trademarks 
was probably unlawful, he was genuinely surprised. "Everyone knows these slogans," he said. 
"They're part of pop culture." [FN161] This comment supports Coombe's point: We do not think of 
commodity/signs as the property of "corporate others," but rather as part of the general culture. 
Because we have popularized these phrases, we believe that we own them, at least in part. 
Perhaps the most interesting thing about "The Pussy List" is its homage to the carnival spirit found 
in Rabelais. Gargantua and Pantagruel is full of lists embodying a run-on durational humor based 
on exaggeration, sheer length, and a "grotesque realism [that] from immemorial times was linked 
with the bodily lower stratum." [FN162] In this, "The Pussy List" is a Web recasting of the famous 
couillon dialogue of Panurge and Friar John in Book III. Eager to marry but besieged by 
contradictory advice, Panurge turns to Friar John, the vinous monk, and begins his plea for advice 
with a litany of praise to the monk's sex organ, or couillon (often translated as "cod," or "ball-bag"):  
Listen, my dainty ballock ball-bag, stumpy ball-bag, lumpy ball-bag, dumpy ball-bag, plaited ball-
bag, leaded ball-bag, milky ball-bag, silky ball-bag, caulked ball-bag, veined ball-bag, mastered ball-
bag, plastered ball-bag, grotesque ball-bag, Arabesque ball-bag, reinforced ball-bag, hare-on-the- 
spit-like ball-bag, ancient ball-bag, confident *483 ball-bag, provident ball-bag . . . . [FN163] 
And so on, through 153 epithets, which, in Bakhtin's analysis, "are extremely varied. They are 
grouped, without strict order, either for their alliteration, rhyme, or even assonance, or according to 
the various fields from which these expressions are taken." [FN164] What they do have in common 
is praise for the monk's couillon. When Friar John, in turn, responds with his own litany, his 150 
epithets for Panurge's couillon are quite different, as befits Panurge in the throes of matrimonial 
indecision:  
Tell me that, you faded ball-bag, jaded ball-bag, musty ball-bag, mouldy ball-bag, mildewed ball-
bag, dangly ball-bag, chilled ball-bag, swallowed ball-bag, cowardly ball-bag, cowed ball-bag, 
broken-down ball-bag, broken- backed ball-bag, incongruous ball-bag, defective ball-bag . . . 
[FN165] 
This couillon list has no deep meaning. It is simply a list, built up through free-association, that 
ransacks the language. Its only point is that you can apply any adjective in the language to couillon, 
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giving it numerous flavors and connotations. The same is true of "The Pussy List." It dares the 
reader to apply "pussy" to any slogan any advertiser has created. [FN166] The similarities between 
the couillon litany and "The Pussy List," however, should not be pushed too far. The former, after 
all, is used for literary exuberance and comic excess. The latter uses literary exuberance and comic 
excess to commit trademark infringement and lure traffic to pornographic websites. Still, the literary 
tradition of carnival, with its roots in Rabelais, seems to have found a home on the Web, praising 
the infinite variety of the female sex organ much as Rabelais praised the male. 
*484 IV. The Authors Retrench: Law and the Cybercarnival 
One of Coombe's themes is that, as trademarks and brands proliferate, and as their uses become 
more and more detached from their original signifying function, law also expands to protect the new 
uses. This Part updates and extends Coombe's analysis by asking: How is intellectual property law 
reacting to the Web commodity/sign carnival? On the one hand, thousands of Web-based 
pasticheurs, bricolageurs, collageurs, and other alters are recombining the icons and symbols of 
popular culture into different forms for fun and profit. On the other hand, the corporate and celebrity 
authors of the commodity/signs fear that the diffuse Web will loosen their hegemony over their 
chosen symbols. Failure to enforce their rights can release the signs into the public domain. Yet 
strict enforcement can cost as much in time, legal fees, and reputation as it saves in intellectual 
property, as is shown by the evolution of Disney from a fun-loving purveyor of cartoons into a 
bigfoot enforcer of corporate conformity and copyright. [FN167] 
In the middle, of course, stands law. In theory, many social uses of commodity/signs are protected 
through exceptions to intellectual property protection. These include permission to dilute a 
trademark when the use is not "commercial" [FN168] or to depict a celebrity when the use is 
"newsworthy," as well as permission to use trademarks and copyrighted works when the use is 
"fair," analysis of which also often turns on whether the use is "commercial" or not. In practice, 
however, the potential alter is often left scratching his head, because, as Coombe points out, courts 
provide contradictory guidance. One court found it non-diluting to name a Muppet character 
"Spa'am" and to exploit the character on commercial television because the use would not be 
harmful to Hormel, the corporate owner of the Spam trademark. [FN169] Another court, in contrast, 
enjoined the use of "Mutant of Omaha . . . Nuclear Holocaust Insurance" on T-shirts, sweatshirts, 
caps, buttons, and coffee mugs because of a damaging association with Mutual of Omaha 
Insurance Co. [FN170] The court found the use of Mutant of Omaha on these "commercial" 
products infringing, while noting, however, that "an editorial parody in a book, magazine or film" 
would not be. [FN171] This is a court with willful blindness toward contemporary culture, where, as 
Coombe observes, political *485 opinions are more likely to be expressed on mugs and T-shirts 
than in corporately-owned TV shows and other mainstream media. 
Similar contradictions attend the "newsworthiness" exception. One court ruled that Ann-Margret 
could not prevent a magazine from publishing a nude picture of her because it was newsworthy, 
while another court upheld a similar claim by another nude subject against the same magazine 
because "she was not shown participating in a newsworthy event." [FN172] Yet a third court refused 
to enjoin the inclusion of a couple's nude photo in a commercial guide to nude beaches because 
"the photographs were not being used for commercial purposes." [FN173] 
Such legal line-drawing between commercial and non-commercial, and between newsworthy and 
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non-newsworthy, is fast becoming obsolete in the real world. As Judge Kozinski pointed out, "[i]n 
our pop culture, where salesmanship must be entertaining and entertainment must sell, the line 
between the commercial and noncommercial has not merely blurred; it has disappeared." Drawing 
too narrow a line between fair and infringing uses harms "the vibrancy of our culture" by restricting 
"[t]he right to draw ideas from a rich and varied public domain, and the right to mock, for profit as 
well as fun, the cultural icons of our time." [FN174] 
Some of the most powerful weapons in controlling trademark connotation are dilution laws, which 
exist in over half the states as well as the federal level. [FN175] Dilution law protects "famous" 
trademarks from uses that, while not confusing to the public, nonetheless diminish the unique 
selling power of the mark by "blurring" or "tarnishing" it. One example that Coombe examines is a 
poster consisting of a reproduction of Coca-Cola's ENJOY COCA- COLA advertisement, rewritten 
as ENJOY COCAINE. [FN176] She notes that Coca- Cola's objection was particularly ironic, 
considering that Coca-Cola's early success was partly based--as its name suggests--on the rumor 
that it contained cocaine. [FN177] Now Coca-Cola tries to hide that association in the attic like an 
aging flapper aunt. 
The passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in January 1996 coincided with the rise of the 
Internet, [FN178] and much of the case law that has arisen under the Act has involved the Web. As 
noted, the Act has been used to prevent cybersquatters from holding famous names hostage from 
*486 trademark owners who want to use them on websites and to prevent alters from using famous 
marks in metatags, which one court called "the essence of dilution." [FN179] The Act has also been 
used to combat spam [FN180] and typosquatting. [FN181] 
The application of dilution law to the Web is no accident. As Senator Patrick Leahy stated, "[I]t is my 
hope that this anti-dilution statute can help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by 
those who are choosing marks that are associated with the products and reputations of others." 
[FN182] 
It is ironic, of course, that the Federal dilution law has found its happiest hunting ground on the 
Web, whose most imaginative content, like other carnivals throughout history, consists of "blurring" 
and "tarnishing"--blurring the distinctions between information and rumor and between public and 
private, and tarnishing every trademark with the reductive "[trademark]sucks.com." [FN183] 
A threshold requirement for a finding of dilution, however, is that the mark in question be "famous," 
within the meaning of the federal act [FN184] or state law. Therefore, trademark owners whose 
marks are insufficiently famous have no recourse under dilution law to prevent alternative Web uses 
of their names. [FN185] 
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, [FN186] passed in November 1999, filled this 
gap. This Act bans the bad faith registration or trafficking in domain names that are identical or 
confusingly similar to a "distinctive" trademark. This obviates the "fame" requirement and ties 
protection instead to the well-known trademark requirement of distinctiveness. [FN187] Thus the 
legal bar is lowered when trademark protection *487 demands it. Intellectual property law has 
learned to abhor a vacuum. [FN188] 
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The expansion of intellectual property law has not escaped the notice of marketable celebrities--
Coombe's second group of authors. The Anti- Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act is, in fact, 
the only federal law that specifically protects celebrity names [FN189]--the result of a compromise 
between the movie studios and actors' organizations. The studios, such as Walt Disney Co. and 
Warner Brothers, originally opposed a cybersquatting bill that protected everything except 
trademarks, fearing that extending protection to celebrities could thwart studios' Internet-related 
publicity for celebrity- named movies such as Nixon and The Doors and open the door to a federal 
right- of-publicity statute that could further limit studios' rights to exploit celebrity names. [FN190] 
Celebrities countered with straight faces that "individuals" should "get the same protection as a big 
company," meaning, of course, only those individuals that are as famous as a big company. 
[FN191] The Act therefore protects not only trademarks, but "famous personal names" from 
exploitation by "unfair" domain name registrations, such as proposing to sell it to a celebrity or 
falsely suggesting celebrity endorsement of the site. [FN192] 
While expanding its coverage of trademark and celebrity rights, federal *488 law also has expanded 
the "limited times" that authors are entitled to copyright protection. This time has expanded from the 
original fourteen years to twenty-eight years to fifty-six years, to fifty years after the author's death. 
[FN193] In 1998 Congress passed the (celebrity-named) Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension 
Act, which extends the term of copyright to life of the author plus seventy years, or--for works made 
for hire or whose authorship cannot be determined--ninety-five years after publication or 120 years 
after creation, whichever is shorter. [FN194] 
The operative provision from the standpoint of Coombe's work is the 95 years after publication for 
works made for hire. This provision includes all corporately-authored works, including motion 
pictures. It is no accident that this Act was passed in 1998 and that the prime movers behind it were 
the Walt Disney Company and Turner Broadcasting. The previous copyright term for works for hire 
was seventy-five years, which meant that copyright would soon start expiring on the first Mickey 
Mouse movies--made in 1929--and on the films of the 1930s. Turner had just acquired the Metro 
Goldwyn Mayer archive of these classic films. The upshot of the Copyright Term Extension Act is to 
keep Mickey Mouse and all the classic films of the 1930s and 1940s out of the public domain for 
another twenty years. [FN195] A challenge to the Sonny Bono law was dismissed, the court holding 
that the "extension of limited times is within the discretion of Congress." [FN196] This decision has 
led some to suggest that a copyright term of "eternity minus a day" would be constitutional, because 
*489 it would be "limited" within Congressional discretion. [FN197] 
As with copyright term extension, the interests being protected in the first spate of Internet-related 
laws are the same corporate intellectual property interests that Coombe finds protected offline. 
Although it is commonly thought that the government has taken a hands-off approach to the 
Internet, a number of laws affecting intellectual property have the effect of privatizing a great deal of 
what is available on the Internet and criminalizing any encroachment on the corporate interests 
protected there. In addition to the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, the Copyright Term 
Extension Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, there are laws that criminalize the making of 
code that might circumvent copy protection. [FN198] 
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As Stanford Law School Professor Lawrence Lessig points out, the cordoning off of the Internet and 
other potentially public property may soon lead to a time when one can "quote Donald Duck" only 
with corporate permission. [FN199] 
The Web, then, appears to be retrenching from a wide-open society to another locus of corporately-
protected intellectual property, where, as Coombe has mapped in the non-Web world, expressions 
of alterity are squelched by existing law as they emerge or are declared illegal by new laws if no old 
law yet forbids them. 
Conclusion 
The commodity/sign carnival on the World Wide Web, and the legal and corporate reactions to it, 
appear to have proceeded along the same broad patterns that Coombe has observed in the non-
Web world. First, commodity/signs proliferate in the new medium as they did in the old. Second, 
alters take hold of the sign--in the form of cybersquatting, typosquatting, metatagging and the like--
and threaten to wrest the commodity/sign from the author's hegemony. Next, reaction sets in, as 
corporate authors use traditional intellectual property law to reassert their rights in the new medium. 
When old law fails, new laws are passed to patch up the leak in the law that the new medium has 
revealed. 
It appears, however, that courts are becoming facile in applying traditional law to Web-based 
activities. As far as trademarks on the Web go, for instance, courts have, as in the offline world, 
been able to distinguish infringing from non-infringing alters largely by drawing the *490 traditional 
line between commercial and noncommercial trademark uses. Pioneer cybersquatter Dennis 
Toeppen, for instance, was brought to heel for his commercial attempts to market such names as 
panavision.com, and not for his noncommercial (and postmodern and carnivalesque) use of 
panavision.com to display pictures of Pana, Illinois. [FN200] The same has been true in the metatag 
cases involving "Playboy" and other trademarks. [FN201] The commercial use of "Playboy" as a 
metatag in the Asian-playmates site was enjoinable as the "essence of dilution" under a 
straightforward and traditional trademark analysis. [FN202] However, Playmate-of-the-Year Terri 
Welles can use the terms "Playmate" and "Playboy" on her Website to describe her status and be 
protected from the wrath of Playboy by the fair use doctrine. [FN203] Similarly, gripe sites 
incorporating [trademark] sucks.com get a free pass from courts because there is no likelihood that 
consumers will think the targeted corporation sponsored its own gripe site--no confusion, no 
infringement. [FN204] 
It will be worth watching how parody--another traditional defense to copyright or trademark 
infringement--fares on the Web. As Coombe repeatedly observes, parody is one of the hallmarks of 
postmodern recodifications--using the culture's own commodity/signs to mock the culture that 
produced them. Recently, in the non-Web world, the parody defense has not fared as well as the 
non-commerciality defense. Perhaps one of the difficulties with the parody defense is that the 
Copyright Act, for instance, allows no separate defense for parody. Instead, whether an imitation of 
a copyrighted work is parody or not depends on an analysis of the fair use factors under § 107 of 
the Copyright Act. Thus, whether a work is a non-infringing parody requires analyzing whether its 
purpose is "criticism" or "comment," whether its use is commercial, and "the amount and 
substantiality" of the copyrighted work that the parody "copies." The parody defense has proved 
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most successful when the medium involved is song lyrics--perhaps because the tradition of writing 
satiric lyrics to popular songs goes back so far that it is imprinted on the judiciary's subconscious. 
[FN205] Thus courts have allowed parodies of popular songs even *491 when such parodies 
involve commercial sales. Such legal parodies include a rewrite of Roy Orbison's Oh Pretty Woman 
(as "big hairy woman," "bald-headed woman,," and "two-timin' woman"), [FN206] of When Sunny 
Gets Blue (as "When Sunny Sniffs Glue"), [FN207] Blue Skies (as "Blue Cross"), and fifty-seven 
parodies of song lyrics in Mad Magazine. [FN208] 
The parody defense has been less successful in other media. This includes print ads such as 
"Michelob Oily" and T-shirts such as "Mutant of Omaha." It also includes popular poetry. A rewrite of 
the Dr. Seuss poem The Cat in the Hat that satirized the O.J. Simpson murder saga was enjoined, 
in part because the target of the parody was more O.J. Simpson than Dr. Seuss. [FN209] Thus, 
there was no apparent "criticism" of Dr. Seuss that would qualify the parody as fair use under § 107 
of the Copyright Act. Using similar thinking, another court issued an injunction (which was quickly 
lifted on appeal) against a parody of Gone with the Wind, entitled, The Wind Done Gone. The Court 
found that the parody "seeks not only to criticize the older but work also . . . to criticize the South for 
its miscegenation, whippings and selling apart familiar." [FN210] These courts seem to want parody 
to exist in a literary vacuum, detached from any criticism of society. 
This is a troubling trend, if followed widely, and seems to direct the law toward a strict literary-
criticism definition of parody. In literature, "parody" in its strictest sense is reserved for works that 
imitate the form of another work while altering the substance, with the aim of debunking the author 
of the original. A classic example is Lewis Carroll's The White Knight's Tale in Through the Looking 
Glass--a literary skewering of Wordsworth's Resolution and Independence. In law, however, parody 
has always meant something more than literary mockery and has embraced the use of popular 
forms to engage in social commentary as well. The Oh Pretty Woman parody, after all, is less a 
commentary on Roy Orbison's original than a social commentary on how times, popular tastes and 
imagination--and popular visions of women--have changed since the original Oh Pretty Woman in 
1964. To say that parody is only parody if its primary object is literary rather than social is a severe 
restriction on the parody defense. 
Another troubling restriction on the parody defense is the insistence that the "amount and 
substantiality" of the work that is copied be sufficient only to "conjure up" the original work in the 
reader's or viewer's mind. [FN211] *492 This has led to some questionable decisions. Jack Benny, 
for instance, once did a parody of the movie Gaslight by using the exact words, settings and 
costumes of the original movie, but changing the stage directions entirely. That the court found the 
work infringing is a troubling indication of courts' literal and word-oriented bent--focusing mostly on 
the "copied" words of the film and ignoring that the stage directions and other visuals (which were 
probably part of the copyrighted work) were changed entirely. [FN212] Another overly literal 
decision involved a parody comic book that placed Mickey Mouse in compromising and 
pornographic situations. The court found that the exact copying of the Mickey Mouse cartoon 
character was more than sufficient to "conjure up" Mickey Mouse. [FN213] This raises the 
unanswerable question of how to parody (or caricature) Mickey Mouse--himself a caricature of a 
real mouse--without drawing a picture of him. 
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The rule that the copying must only "conjure up" the original is particularly stifling in postmodern 
works, which often depend on exact, detailed copying of popular images as a central element in 
social commentary. In Rogers v. Koons, [FN214] for instance, sculptor Jeff Koons parodied a 
copyrighted photograph entitled Puppies, which showed a smiling man and wife holding eight 
German shepherd puppies in their laps. Koons' parody sculpture froze the couple's expressions into 
glazed dumb-struckedness and the puppies as eight identical, robotic critters with identical bulbous 
noses. The Koons sculpture, entitled String of Puppies, was exhibited in 1988 in the Sonnabend 
Gallery in New York City as part of what Koons called the Banality Show, intended, as its title 
suggests, to comment on the blandness of contemporary American culture. 
When the photographer, however, sued for copyright infringement, the court analyzed the "amount 
and substantiality" of the copying, found the sculpture virtually identical to the photograph, failed to 
see any "comment or criticism" that Koons was making about the saccharine original, and rejected 
the parody defense. [FN215] Taking Koons at his word that his work was intended "to comment 
critically both on the incorporated object and *493 the political and economic system that created it," 
the court ignored that Koons was satirizing--among other things--the social atmospherics of the 
original Puppies photograph, instead holding that there was no right simply to use "another's 
copyrighted work to make a statement on some aspect of society at large." [FN216] 
This analysis of postmodernist parodies could have a telling effect, ignoring as it does that the 
appropriation and recodification of mass media imagery are central to postmodernism. "[W]hen an 
artist places a familiar image in a new context, the maneuver forces the viewer to reconsider how 
different contexts affect meaning and to understand that all meaning is socially constructed." 
[FN217] According to the reasoning of Rogers v. Koons, such creative recodings are, in law, 
"essentially theft or piracy." [FN218] 
I have sought to answer the first question I posed at the outset of this Review: How have corporate 
interests maintained their hold on commodity/signs in the World Wide Web carnival? My second 
question--Can the World Wide Web loosen corporate interests' continued hoarding of 
commodity/signs?--remains unanswered. Does the Web allow the opportunity for such wholesale 
reappropriation of cultural icons that the corporate grip must necessarily slip? Or, will corporate 
interests retain their hold on popular symbols by eventually controlling the Web--as they have 
controlled all other media, no matter how populist and democratic those media may have been in 
their formative years? 
It may be, in fact, that, as in traditional media, visibility and traceability are fatal to alternative uses 
on the Web. The more folkloric such alternative uses become, the more likely they will flourish. Take 
"The Pussy List," for example. [FN219] It probably began as a work of individual authorship, was 
added to by successive editors and was distributed seriatim among a small group of porn 
sitemasters. Eventually, however, it began to be distributed anonymously and undetectably, copied 
into the invisible metatags of freely downloadable software. Some of the users of "The Pussy List," 
for instance, had no idea it was on their sites--it had simply been copied in along with some other 
downloaded free software. If it had not been squelched early, it is entirely possible that "The Pussy 
List" would have spread as anonymously and untraceably as the Star Trek rewrites and trademark 
rumors that Coombe describes. [FN220] It would have *494 become imprinted in the DNA of the 
Web, a recessive gene that emerged willy-nilly on various websites without the webmasters' even 
27 
 
 
being aware of it. This would have been a folkloric, carnivalesque spread of pornographic parodies 
of corporate trademarks that would have proved impossible to eradicate. [FN221] 
At first blush, it seems that the Web might be just the fresh air that postmodern culture needs in 
order to loosen centralized control of popular images. There is some actual basis for this hope in the 
Web's early reactions to governmental and corporate bigfooting. In the summer of 1995, for 
instance-- the dark ages of the Web--a study out of Carnegie-Mellon University purported to show 
that an astonishingly high percentage of Internet usage involved pornography. [FN222] The study 
generated much heat, much law journal commentary, a front page story in Time magazine, and an 
invitation for the author of the study to appear before Congress. The study also provided fuel for the 
portion of the Communications Decency Act--later passed as part of the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act and struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court--that criminalized the transmission of 
"indecent" content on the Internet on the grounds that children might have access to it. 
The study's attack on the Web, and the Web's response to it, show how rapidly this new 
communications medium reacts. As soon as it became public, the study was hit with a firestorm of 
Web criticism--exposing both the study itself and its purported author as shams. The rapid response 
was made possible by the nature of the Web, a many-to-many communication that refuses to let a 
Big Lie like the Carnegie-Mellon study rest unopposed for long. [FN223] Debunked by the many on 
the Web, the Carnegie-Mellon author was exposed, his study discounted, his Congressional 
invitation withdrawn, and a good portion of the quasi-factual rug was pulled out from under the 
"indecency" portions of the Communications Decency Act. 
It remains to be seen whether the Web can react in similar fashion to loosen corporate control of 
corporate imagery. To some, the Web is an ideal of perfect democratic communications, where 
virtual communities *495 emerge, police themselves, and serve as a populist antidote to centralized 
alarmism, whether corporate or governmental. [FN224] This vision of the Web is something like the 
W.A.S.T.E. system in Thomas Pynchon's The Crying of Lot 49. [FN225] There, protagonist Oedipa 
Maas is astonished to uncover a secret mail system, operational since the Middle Ages, whereby 
millions of people have been secretly communicating with each other, in silent defiance of the 
officially-controlled PTTs of Europe, the U.S. Mail, and even corporately- controlled private postal 
systems like Wells Fargo and American Express.  
For here were God knew how many citizens, deliberately choosing not to communicate by U.S. 
Mail. It was not an act of treason, nor possibly even of defiance. But it was a calculated withdrawal 
from the life of the Republic from its machinery. Whatever else was being denied them out of hate, 
indifference to the power of their vote, loopholes, simple ignorance, this withdrawal was their own, 
unpublicized, private. Since they could not have withdrawn into a vacuum (could they?), there had 
to exist the separate, silent unsuspected world. [FN226] 
In the World Wide Web, Pynchon's imagined W.A.S.T.E. system may have emerged from the 
underground to become the dominant means of communication--unfettered by government and too 
slippery to be controlled by corporate interests. 
Whether the Web can loosen the corporate grip on commodity/signs remains to be seen. One trend 
appears to be emerging, however. Formerly, a corporation, confronted with an alter that was using 
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its sign in an unwelcome manner, would write a threatening letter to the offender and, after a few 
squeaks of outrage, the alter would yield and that would be the end of it. In this manner, corporate 
intellectual property lawyers could pick off their alters piecemeal without any of them becoming 
aware of each other. 
Now, however, such demand letters are not swallowed in silence, but posted on the Web for all to 
see. Such was the case with the verizonreallysucks.com demand letter. [FN227] No sooner had Bell 
Atlantic told the verizonreallysucks alter to cease and desist than the letter was posted on the Web, 
zapped from chat group to chat group, and Bell Atlantic's bullying exposed. Did it make Bell Atlantic 
back off? Nobody knows. But clearly the best hope for loosening the corporate grip on 
commodity/signs is that the Web carnival will prove too exuberant and overwhelming to put *496 
down, and that corporations--like the Medieval Church--will see the value of embracing the carnival 
once they find themselves powerless to control it. [FN228] 
 
[FNa1]. Associate, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York, New York; Adjunct Professor of Law, New 
York Law School. The views expressed in this Review are my own and do not reflect those of 
Debevoise & Plimpton. 
 
[FN1]. Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Authorship, Appropriation, 
and the Law 4(1998). 
[FN2]. Id. at 5. 
[FN3]. Id. at 15. 
[FN4]. Id. at 31. 
[FN5]. Id. at 6. 
[FN6]. Id. at 133-34. 
[FN7]. Id. at 27. 
[FN8]. Id. 
[FN9]. Id. at 119. 
[FN10]. Id. 
[FN11]. Id. at 146. 
[FN12]. Id. at 152-59. 
[FN13]. Id. at 159 (quoting Patricia Turner, I Heard it Through the Grapevine: Rumor in African-
American Culture 100 (1993)). 
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[FN14]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 112. 
[FN15]. Id. at 113-14. 
[FN16]. Elvis Presley Enter. v. Elvisly Yours, 817 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 
[FN17]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 99. 
[FN18]. Id. at 98. 
[FN19]. Id. at 127-28. Robin Curtis, who played Saavik in the Star Trek movies, explained, "I really 
had no idea that this all existed.... really, the care and the time which people devote to something.... 
It is really quite an honor to be the receiver of that kind of appreciation." Id. According to Coombe, 
"Shatner and Nimoy have commented appreciatively on fanzines generally and found the 
homoerotic texts surprising but not inconceivable given what they now see as the "campiness" of 
some of the old episodes." Id. 
[FN20]. Id. at 146ff. 
[FN21]. Peter Jaszi, The Author Effect II, in The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in 
Law and Literature 40 (Martha Woodmannsee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994). 
 
[FN22]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 137. 
[FN23]. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod., Inc., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 
[FN24]. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 
[FN25]. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
933 (1988). 
[FN26]. Anheuser-Busch v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 
[FN27]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 9. 
[FN28]. Rosemary J. Coombe, Critical Cultural Legal Studies, 10 Yale J.L. & Human. 463 (1998). 
 
[FN29]. Coombe does, however, note in passing that the author-alter tension extends to the digital 
era, where "every reading of a digital text on the information highway is deemed a theft of authorial 
property." Coombe, supra note 1, at 285. See also Mark A. Lemley, Book Review, Romantic 
Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 873, 896 (1997) (lamenting the trend of 
characterizing trademark and copyright infringement as "theft" and explaining that "'infringement' 
may be a morally neutral term, but 'theft' is clearly wrong, and courts are more likely to be inclined to 
punish the latter"). Professor Coombe has lately applied her analysis of commodity/signs to include 
"Digital environments such as the World Wide Web [which] enable practices that promise to 
transform the nature of corporate/consumer relations by undermining the traditional capacities of 
30 
 
 
companies to manage their images and control their imagery." Rosemary Coombe & Andrew 
Herman, Trademarks, Property, and Propriety: The Moral Economy of Consumer Politics and 
Coporate Accountability on the World Wide Web, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 597 (2000). 
[FN30]. Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and his world (Helene Iswolsky trans., The MIT Press 1968) 
(1940). 
 
[FN31]. So are celebrity names and images. See, e.g., Patrick McGeehan, Salton Pays $137.5 
Million For George Foreman's Name, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1999, at C2. 
 
[FN32]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 56. 
[FN33]. 2 McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 15:8. 
 
[FN34]. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 
U.S. 830 (1963). 
[FN35]. Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Netscape Comm. Corp., 55 F. Supp.2d 1070, 1077 (C.D. Cal.) 
(explaining that trademarks Playboy® and Playmate® "have become inherently distinctive and have 
acquired secondary meaning"), aff'd, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999). 
[FN36]. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (D.N.Y. 1921). 
[FN37]. Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 
601 (1936). 
[FN38]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 9. 
[FN39]. Id. at 15. 
[FN40]. Id. at 31. 
[FN41]. Id. at 53 (citing G.D. Cox, Don't Mess With The Mouse: Disney's Legal Army Protects A 
Revered Image, Nat'l. L.J., Jul. 1, 1989 at 1). 
[FN42]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 9. 
[FN43]. Id. at 39. 
[FN44]. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
[FN45]. Jaszi, supra note 21, at 32-33 (noting that "firms and individuals with capital investments," 
rather than individual private authors, are the most likely plaintiffs in a copyright suit). 
 
[FN46]. Lemley, supra note 29, at 883 (noting that "in 1955, forty percent of all copyright 
registrations were for works made for hire" and that such percentage has likely increased since 
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then, given the growth in corporate authorship and the software industry). 
 
[FN47]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 52. 
[FN48]. Id. at 55. 
[FN49]. Id. at 57. When President Ford in 1974 introduced himself to the nation as "A Ford, not a 
Lincoln," everyone knew what he meant. 
[FN50]. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), for instance, the Supreme 
Court found that a television news broadcast of the plaintiff's complete "human cannonball" act 
unfairly robbed Zacchini of something that was uniquely his. 
 
[FN51]. This analogy has been criticized as a "fixation on act rather than identity [that] has had a 
profound, and negative, effect on publicity rights doctrine." Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The 
Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 Duke L.J. 383, 402 (1999). 
[FN52]. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 951 (1992). 
 
[FN53]. Waits v. Frito-Lay Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1080 (1993). 
 
[FN54]. Coombe, supra note1, at 88 (citing Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: 
Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 127, 173 n.229 (1993). In some states, the 
survivability of the right of publicity has been legislated by statute. In 1999, at the urging of Fred 
Astaire's widow, California extended the post-mortem right to 70 years. Cal. Civil Code § 3344.1 
(2000). The law is entitled the Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act, which guarantees Fred 
Astaire's survival in law, if not in fact, and shows that legislatures are free to exploit a celebrity's 
right of publicity. See also infra note 194, for a discussion of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act. 
[FN55]. White v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993). 
[FN56]. Id. 
[FN57]. Id. 
[FN58]. Id. 
[FN59]. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867 (C.D. Cal. 1999), rev'd, 2001 WL 
754769 (9th Cir. July 6, 2001) (finding the use of Hoffman's image not to be "commercial speech"). 
 
[FN60]. Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997), rehearing denied, 197 F.3d 1284 (9th 
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 33 (2000). Apparently, the robots are not particularly funny and 
have not added to the bars' popularity. "'They break all the time,' one person involved in the case 
said, 'And Host found that the bars did just as well without them. Now when they stop talking they 
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just throw them away."' Jeffrey Toobin, The Bench: The Case of the "Cheers" Replicants, New 
Yorker, Mar.27, 2000, at 34. On June 18, 2001, the two actors reached a confidential settlement 
with Host International. Entertainment Weekly, News & Notes, July 13, 2001, at 14. 
[FN61]. Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1285. 
[FN62]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 49. "Bricolage," a somewhat derogatory term in French, means 
"odds and ends." (Cf. "bric-a-brac"). In the postmodernist sense that Coombe uses the term, it 
means using materials at hand to create something new--"materials that have traditional or given 
meanings may be appropriated and given multiple and contradictory signification." Haemmerli, 
supra note 51, at 432 n.201. 
[FN63]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 23. 
[FN64]. Camille Paglia, Sexual Personae 24-25 (1990). 
[FN65]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 31. 
[FN66]. Id. at 58. 
[FN67]. Id. at 26. 
[FN68]. Id. at 8. 
[FN69]. Id. at 96. See also Madow, supra note 54, at 181-82 (1993) ("[T] here is a good deal more 
to the generation of a commercially marketable public image than the 'labor' of the star herself."). 
Furthermore, once celebrities achieve distinction, they often are rewarded with intellectual property 
protection over uses of their image that they expended no labor in creating. For instance, Johnny 
Carson was able to prevent the use of "Here's Johnny" for portable toilets ("The World's Foremost 
Commodian"), although it was his sidekick Ed McMahon who popularized the slogan. See Carson v. 
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). Bela Lugosi was given a partial 
monopoly over "his facial characteristics and the individual manner of his likeness and appearance 
as Count Dracula," Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813 (1979), which had as much to do 
with the makeup department as with Lugosi. See also James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and 
Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society 103 (1996) ("[I]n each case, the 
plaintiffs did not expend great labor, emotion, or even much originality in creating the protectable 
'mark." '). 
 
[FN70]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 94. Coombe's view of celebrity as a collaboration between the 
actor and the public has been attacked, most recently and thoroughly by Alice Haemmerli. See 
Haemmerli, supra note 51. According to Professor Haemmerli, right of publicity law has traditionally 
been based on John Locke's labor theory of value (i.e., that a celebrity has a right to the fruits of his 
own labor). Id. at 411-12. She rejects this view in favor of a "Kantian" view that "the rational human 
being has absolute worth as an end in himself," id. at 413, arguing that a celebrity "persona" 
deserves protection regardless of its economic value. Appropriation of celebrity images, according 
to Haemmerli, deprives actors of their rights to control their "personhood," including the "objectified 
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images" that personhood creates. Id. at 421. "Thus, a strong argument can be advanced that uses 
of an individual's persona strike at the heart of one's personhood even more than appropriation of 
an individual's expression," as is the case with copyright infringement. Id. at 422 n.169. Here, there 
is neither space nor excuse for a critique of Professor Haemmerli's thorough and provocative work. 
Any such critique, however, would begin by noting that the people whose personas are being 
protected are, by and large, actors, whose craft, almost by definition, requires recognition and 
participation by the public. As an English court once said, in refusing to extend right of publicity law, 
"[S]ome men and women voluntarily enter professions which by their nature invite publicity, and 
public approval or disapproval. It is not unreasonable in their case that they should submit without 
complaint to their names and occupations and reputations being treated... almost as public 
property." Tolley v. Fry (1930) I K.B. 467, 477, rev'd on other grounds (1931) AC 333. 
 
[FN71]. In confining her discussion to corporately-authored commodity/signs and commercially-
viable celebrity images, Coombe avoids much of the "full-court author bashing" of which 
postmodern criticism has been accused. See Boyle, supra note 69, at 103 ("Poststructuralist 
philosophy has produced a fair amount of author bashing [but] I do not believe that authorship is a 
patriarchal, phallocentric plot."). Others have described the postmodernist critique of "romantic 
authorship" in equally assaultive terms. See, e.g., Haemmerli, supra note 51, at 411-12 & n.117 
(describing the postmodernist critiques of right-of- publicity law as an "onslaught" of critics, "often 
parroting" each other, an image that conjures up Hitchcock's The Birds). Despite such counter-
punches, "author-bashing" has a point. As Peter Jaszi points out, the "romantic" notion of an 
individual "author" of a work, ignores that many "works" are a result of "'serial collaborations--works 
resulting from successive elaborations of an idea or text by a series of creative workers, occurring 
perhaps over years or decades.... [W]here the law formerly envisioned the possibility of improving 
existing works by redaction or expansion, modern copyright is more myopic, focusing exclusively on 
the potential for harm to the interests of the original author."' Jaszi, supra note 21, at 40. Such 
"serial collaborations" between author and the public are what fills trademarks and celebrities with 
meaning, as is less the case with the more elaborated "writings of an author" that are the subject-
matter of copyright. 
 
[FN72]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 31. 
[FN73]. Id. at 21-22. 
[FN74]. Id. at 19. 
[FN75]. Id. at 70. 
[FN76]. Id. at 21-22. 
[FN77]. Id. at 82-85. Specifically, Coombe cites the following works: M.M.Bakhtin, The Dialogic 
Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin (MichaelHolquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist 
trans., Univ. of Tex. Press 1981) (1975); M.Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics (Caryl 
Emerson trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984) (1972); Bakhtin and Cultural Theory (Ken Hirschkop & 
David Shepherd eds., 1989); SimonDentith, Bakhtinian Thought: An Introductory Reader (1995); 
34 
 
 
MichaelGardiner, The Diologics of Critique: M.M. Bakhtin and the Theory of Ideology (1986); and 
Michael Holquist, Diliogism: Bakhtin and His World (1990). 
 
[FN78]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 83-84. 
[FN79]. Id. at 84. 
[FN80]. Id. 
[FN81]. Id. (citing Dentith, supra note 77, at 24). 
[FN82]. Id. at 84-85. The effect of and battles against this "one-way dialogue" have recently been 
documented in Naomi Klein, NO Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies (2000). Klein cites a litany of 
corporate enforcement and protective actions, including the owners of Barney's refusal to let shops 
rent out purple dinosaur costumes, the previously cited removal of Disney characters from a 
playground mural, and Mattel's suit against the rock band Aqua for its hit song Barbie Girl. "Culture," 
according to Klein, has become "something that happens to you. You buy it at the Virgin Megastore 
or Toys 'R' Us.... It is not something in which you participate, or to which you have a right to 
respond." Id. at 178. 
[FN83]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 85 (citing Gardiner, supra note 77, at 177). 
 
[FN84]. Id. 
[FN85]. Id. at 134. 
[FN86]. Bakhtin, supra note 30. 
[FN87]. Id. at 5. 
[FN88]. Id. at 13. 
[FN89]. Id. at 14. See also Stephen Nissenbaum, The Battle for Christmas 8-13 (1996), which 
traces the Christmas celebration back to medieval times, as a season of ritualized topsy-turvy, when 
servants mocked masters with impunity. The carnival origins of Christmas celebrations--and their 
threat to the established order--had much to do with the suppression of Christmas celebrations in 
the New England colonies. According to Nissenbaum, the revival of Christmas in the early 
nineteenth century as a season of gift-giving may owe as much to merchandising as to anything 
else. 
[FN90]. Bakhtin, supra note 30, at 8. 
[FN91]. Id. at 9. 
[FN92]. Id. at 11. 
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[FN93]. Id. at 8-11. 
[FN94]. Id. at 12. 
[FN95]. Id. at 18. 
[FN96]. Adlai Stevenson Quotations, available at http:// 
www.intelligentsianetwork.com/adlai/adlai.htm (last visited January 8, 2001). 
 
[FN97]. Bakhtin, supra note 30, at 135-37. 
[FN98]. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37. 
[FN99]. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1997). 
 
[FN100]. There is arguably an even closer nexus between celebrities and sacred symbols. As 
Jonathan Bate explains:  
In the Eastern Churches, an icon is a painting, mosaic, or other representation of a sacred person 
which is itself regarded as sacred.... To speak of a movie or rock star as an icon is to give a secular 
infliction to this belief. The worshipper attributes divinity to the performer on stage or screen. The 
connection with the sacred origin of the idea is deliberately exploited by Madonna in her choice of a 
name for herself. 
Jonathan Bate, The Genius of Shakespeare 253 (1998). 
[FN101]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 60; see also Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1997). 
 
[FN102]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 60. 
[FN103]. Id. at 61 (citing K. Aoki, Authors, Inventors, and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual 
Property and the Public Domain, Part I, 18(1) Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 1, 4 (1993)). 
 
[FN104]. Panavision v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1301 (C.D. Cal. 1996), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1316 
(9th Cir. 1998). 
[FN105]. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1325 n.5. See also Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and 
the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687, 1706 (1999) ("Rather than identifying the good 
with a particular manufacturer, and thereby guaranteeing its quality, the identifier is itself the 
product."). 
[FN106]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 55. 
[FN107]. Id. at 53 (citing R. Barnet and J. Cavanagh, Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the 
New World Order 66 (1994)). 
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[FN108]. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). 
[FN109]. Id. at 1010. 
[FN110]. Id. at 1010-11. 
[FN111]. Id. at 1014. 
[FN112]. Id. at 1011. 
[FN113]. The wholesale licensing of trademark has the inevitable effect of shrinking the public 
domain by "dividing the commons into private property." Further, "the power the intellectual property 
owner has over those rights is increasing," as fair use diminishes, "particularly if the licensor can 
show that some money could have been squeezed out of the user. Trademark owners can prevent 
uses of their marks as obvious parodies or for entirely noncommercial purposes, and are well on 
their way to owning the exclusive right to pun." Lemley, supra note 29, at 900. 
[FN114]. Leslie Eaton, And Now, a Balloon From Our Sponsor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1999, at A1. 
 
[FN115]. Even a high-flying balloon could not keep pets.com aloft. The company closed down in 
November 2000, "after failing to find a financial backer or buyer." Pets.com Put To Sleep, CBS 
News, Nov. 7, 2000, http.// www.cbsnews.com.htm. To reinforce Coombe's thesis that 
commodity/signs become more important than the company's products, see Ali Asadullah, Did 
Pets.com wrongfully kill Sock Puppet? Upside Magazine, Nov. 13, 2000, http.//www. 
upsidenews.com.On-Trial.htm. 
 
[FN116]. The parade can also be seen as a carnival performed by the marketplace establishment 
rather than against it. For genuine carnival uses of commodity/signs it is necessary to go to New 
York's Greenwich Village for the Halloween parade, or to Europe, where carnival parades still 
survive, and parodies of corporate trademarks and current celebrities have replaced the inverted 
ecclesiastical parodies of other times. Lucy Ferriss, for example, describes how, in the Carnaval of 
the Giants in Aalst, Belgium:  
Nothing is sacred. The floats are monstrous in every sense of the word. Preceding them are teams 
of devil line-dancing, sailors mimicking "The Full Monty," rats fleeing the sinking Titanic labeled 
"Belgica," schoolmarms dancing to "Stop in the Name of Love." The Carnaval Prince is a blend of 
Elvis, Liberace and a Musketeer in a black cape.  
Belgium Revels in 'Carnival' Traditions, Int'l Herald Trib., Jan. 21, 2000, at 10. 
 
[FN117]. In fact, the infringing balloon was The Cat in the Hat, which is more likely to be subject to 
copyright than trademark, but the point is the same. Douglas Martin, Chilly, Wet Parade Rolls As 
Crowds Try to See It, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1999, at B5. 
 
[FN118]. Klein, supra note 82, at 302. 
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[FN119]. In the 2000 Presidential campaign, MasterCard accused Nader himself of trademark and 
copyright infringement for parodying its advertising: "Grilled tenderloin for fund-raiser: $1,000 a 
plate. Campaign ads filled with half- truths: $10 million. Promises to special interest groups: over 
$10 billion. Finding out the truth: priceless. There are some things money can't buy. Without Ralph 
Nader in the presidential debates, the truth will come in last." Nader's Parody Ad Draws Lawsuit 
From MasterCard, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 2000, at A24. A federal judge rejected MasterCard's 
attempt to monopolize its grammatical construction and found Nader's ad to be protected political 
speech under the First Amendment. Mark Hamblett, Judge Backs Nader's Parody of MasterCard 
Ad, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 13, 2000, at 1. 
[FN120]. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
[FN121]. Steve Lohr, Welcome to the Internet, the First Global Colony, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 2000, § 
4 at 1 (quoting Fareed Zakaria, managing editor of Foreign Affairs). 
[FN122]. Bakhtin, supra note 30, at 10. 
[FN123]. "Surf" is therefore a good term for the Web. One skims along the surface of it. 
 
[FN124]. F.T.C. Working Paper, Dot Com Disclosures (May 3, 2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/dotcom/index.html. 
 
[FN125]. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 97-3055 (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 28, 1997). 
 
[FN126]. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99-07654WDK (C.D. Cal. filed July 23, 1999). 
See Bob Tedeschi, Ticketmaster Sues Again Over Links, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1999. http:// 
www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/08/cyber/articles/10tickets.html. 
 
[FN127]. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., Complaint P 17. 
[FN128]. On March 27, 2000, most claims against tickets.com were dismissed with the court ruling 
that deep-linking does not constitute misappropriation or trespass. As the court wrote, "it is hard to 
see how entering a publicly available web site could be called trespass, since all are invited to 
enter," thereby dismissing the notion that the only permitted entry can be through the home page. 
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended 
Complaint (March 27, 2000) at 6. 
[FN129]. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 
[FN130]. The Internet originated in 1969 as a "net" of linked computers set up by the Advanced 
Research Project Agency (ARPA), hence ARPANET. It eventually expanded beyond defense-
related computer networks to encompass universities, corporations, and individuals around the 
world, its name evolving through "DARPA Internet" to plain "Internet." Reno, 521 U.S. at 850. 
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[FN131]. Gretchen Morgenson, For Time Warner Shareholders, A More Volatile Future Beckons; 
AOL's Gamble. "The Nerds Have Won," Int'l Herald Trib., Jan. 12, 2000, at 4. 
[FN132]. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996) (describing the 
Monty Python skit in some detail); see also Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d 
1020, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (defining "spam" as unsolicited commercial bulk e-mail, with no 
reference to spam's origin in cans or Monty Python, thereby demonstrating how "spam," like "bug" 
and "boot" have entered Web-speak and lost their original denotation entirely). 
[FN133]. Andrew Pollack, Show Business Embraces Web, But Cautiously, N.Y. Times, Nov.8, 1999, 
at 1. 
[FN134]. In her later work, Coombe has in fact noted this very characteristic of the Web. Coombe & 
Herman, supra note 29, at 600 ("The Web provides unprecedented opportunities for new and 
dynamic dialogues between producers of products and imagery, and those who consume them."). 
[FN135]. Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996), aff'd 141 F.3d1316 
(9th Cir. 1998); see Jeremy D. Mishkin, Master of Your Domain--An Overview of the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 18 Comm. Law. 3 (2000) ("if ever there were a poster 
child for the cybersquatter, it would be Dennis Toeppen"); see also Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 
F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding Toeppen liable for trademark dilution of Intermatic's 
trademark by registering intermatic.com as a domain name and attempting to sell it toIntermatic). 
 
[FN136]. Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1300. 
[FN137]. Examples are available at http://www.flairmail.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2000), which sells 
variants of famous trademarks as vanity e-mail addresses, including names such as 
nyrangers1.com and redsox1.com. 
[FN138]. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 
[FN139]. Id. at 1165. 
[FN140]. Id. 
[FN141]. See infra text accompanying notes 201-219. 
[FN142]. Search of Saegis Worldwide Domain Names, (Jan. 24, 2000) (using the search criterion 
"Domain Name: *sucks.*"). Cybersquatting on gripe sites is a recent Web phenomenon. Web 
pornographer Dan Parisi has registered the domain names of over 500 of the world's largest 
companies with the suffix "sucks.com," including TWAsucks.com, MerrillLynchsucks.com and 
GMsucks.com. Greg Farrell, From Sour Grapes to Online Whine Firm Dread Creation of Gripers' 
Portal, USA Today, Apr. 7, 2000, at 1B. Parisi's new Website, sucks.com, advertises itself as "the 
Website Corporate America wants to shut down" and features the "Corporate America Sucks 500 
List." http://www.flairmail.com.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2001). The Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act may have given trademark owners a new weapon against gripe sites. See infra text 
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accompanying notes 186-192. Another weapon that trademark owners have used is simply to 
register every possible variant of their company name, including ".sucks" variants. The discount 
travel e-firm, Priceline, registered, "Pricelinesucks.com," Chase Manhattan owns "Ihatechase.com," 
"Chasestinks.com," "Chasesucks.com," and even "Chaseblows.com." The question remains, how 
many variants can one corporation cover, and at what cost? Coombe & Herman, supra note 29, at 
609. 
 
[FN143]. "The machine readable code is the hidden part of the Internet upon which search engines 
rely to find sites that contain content which the individual user wishes to locate. The basic 
mechanics is that the web page designer places certain keywords in an unreadable portion of the 
web page that tells the search engine what is on a particular page." Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1165 
n.3. 
[FN144]. No.97-734-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359 (E.D. Va. Feb.2, 1998); see also Playboy 
Enters. Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
[FN145]. Playboy, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359 at *8. 
[FN146]. 7 F.Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D. Cal), aff'd, 162 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1998). 
[FN147]. Id. at 1103-04. 
[FN148]. Id. 
[FN149]. See http://www.infobeat.com/stories/cgi/story.cgi?id+2560305071- 8b5. 
[FN150]. Susan Kuchinskas, Image is Everything, Wired News, June 18, 1998, available at 
http://wired.com/news/news/email/other/culture/story/13075.html, cited in Haemmerli, supra note 51, 
at 389 n.21. According to Professor Haemmerli, "The concern that an individual might be made to 
appear in fictitious acts is a real one.... One can readily imagine a public figure 'appearing' in a fake 
infomercial on the Internet, or a secretly homophobic actor being made to host a gay men's health 
telethon. Despite the potentially informative or charitable nature of such uses, they would still 
amount to 'virtual kidnapping." ' Id. 
 
[FN151]. People, Dec. 21, 1998, at 18, cited in Haemmerli, supra note 51, at 394 n.33. 
 
[FN152]. Mark Sableman, Link Law: The Emerging Law of Internet Hyperlinks, 4Comm. L. & Pol'y 
557, 563 (1999). 
[FN153]. People v. Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S. 2d 468, 475 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1997). 
[FN154]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 9. 
[FN155]. Frederic Schauer, Fear, Risk And The First Amendment: Unraveling The "Chilling Effect," 
58 B.U. L. Rev. 685 (1978). 
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[FN156]. Sableman, supra note 152, at 585. 
[FN157]. Peter Johnson, Pornography Drives Technology, Fed. Comm. L.J. 217 (1996); see also 
Porn Site Soon to Solicit Consumer Gripes, Daily Rec., Apr. 7, 2000, (describing the evolution of 
Web pornography sites into gripe-site cybersquatting). 
[FN158]. James Collins, Wall Street Follies: Where are all the paper billionaires in the on-line porn 
business?, New Yorker, Aug. 16, 1999, at 23. 
[FN159]. "The Pussy List," formerly available at, inter alia, http:// 
www.pussy.pleasure.com/ppfirst.htm (last visited May 29, 1998). 
[FN160]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 39 ("Corporate trademarks are 'friends from our childhood'...."). 
 
[FN161]. Telephone Interview with Peter Johnson (June 1, 1998). Demand letters from the 
trademark-holders' attorneys soon put a stop to the "Pussy List" metatag. By way of full disclosure, 
the author of this Review sent such demand letters on behalf of a client whose trademark appeared 
in "The Pussy List." 
[FN162]. Bakhtin, supra note 30, at 20. 
 
[FN163]. Francois Rabelais, Gargantua and Pantagruel 360 (bk. 3, ch. 26) (J.M. Cohen trans., 
Penguin Books 1955) (1546). 
[FN164]. Bakhtin, supra note 30, at 417. 
[FN165]. Rabelais, supra note 163, at 366 (bk. 3, ch. 28). 
[FN166]. The reductionist technique of "The Pussy List" is like the adolescent game in which the 
phrase "between the sheets" is added to any song title, producing I Saw Mama Kissing Santa 
Clause (Between the Sheets) and I Love Paris (Between the Sheets). This game is popular among 
scholars as well. See Marjorie Garber, Symptoms of Culture 199 (1998) ("During a meal at a 
Chinese restaurant, critic Terry Castle once taught me an invaluable lesson about what might be 
called situational grammar. Any fortune-cookie fortune could be immeasurably altered, and 
enriched, she pointed out, by simply adding to it the phrase 'in bed.' (Try this yourself and you will 
see.)"). Another example, on the Web, is The Birth of a Candy Bar, which uses graphic scanned-in 
images of trademarked wrappers of famous candy bars to tell the following story:  
One PAYDAY, MR. GOODBAR wanted a BIT O'HONEY so he took Miss HERSHEY's behind the 
POWERHOUSE on the corner of CLARK and 5TH AVENUE. He began to feel her MOUNDS with 
his BUTTERFINGER. That was pure ALMOND JOY. It made her TOOTSIE ROLL and he let out a 
SNICKERS, as she screamed OH HENRY! while squeezing his PETER PAUL. Miss HERSHEY's 
said: you are even better than the 3 MUSKETEERS. Soon she was a bit CHUNKY and nine months 
later had a BABY RUTH.  
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at http://member.empowering.com/tjmed.candy. 
 
[FN167]. See Frank Rich, We All Pass Go. They Collect $200, N.Y. Times, June 3, 2000, at A13 
("Disney [is] described by The Wall Street Journal as 'one of America's most aggressive corporate 
bullies." '). 
[FN168]. Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(C) (1997). 
[FN169]. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 
[FN170]. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 48 
U.S. 933 (1988). 
[FN171]. Id. at 402. 
[FN172]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 262. 
[FN173]. Id. 
[FN174]. White v. Samsung Elec., 989 F.2d 1512, 1520-21 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993). 
[FN175]. Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) 1997. 
[FN176]. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
[FN177]. Coombe, supra note 1, at 72 (citing E. Kahn, The Big Drink: the Story of Coca-Cola 54-55, 
101-103 (1960), and M. Schatzman et al., Coca and Cocaine: A Bibliography, 8 J. Psychedelic 
Drugs 95, 97 (1976)). 
[FN178]. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). The Act gives the "owner of a famous mark" protection "against 
another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the 
mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark." 
 
[FN179]. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asia Focus Int'l, Inc., No. 97-734-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10359 at 
*30 (E.D. Va., Feb. 2, 1998). 
[FN180]. See supra text accompanying note 23; see also Hotmail v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., 47 
S.P.Q.2d 1021, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 1998) ("[T]he use of identical marks by defendants who are sending 
e-mails to thousands of e-mail users across the country and the world through identical trade 
channels threatens to dilute the distinctiveness of plaintiff's trademark and threatens to harm 
plaintiff's business reputation."). 
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[FN181]. Electronics Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, No. Civ. A. 00-4055, 2001 WL 83388 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2001) (Anticybersquatting Act invoked to enjoin bad faith registration of 
www.electronicboutique.com and www.electronicbotique.com). 
[FN182]. 141 Cong. Rec. 19312-01 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (emphasis 
added). 
[FN183]. See supra text accompanying notes 138-142. 
[FN184]. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1997). 
[FN185]. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp. 1337 (C.D. Cal. 1998), rev'd, 
189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that although Avery and Dennison might be distinctive, they 
do not rise to the level of "famous" marks deserving dilution protection). 
 
[FN186]. 5 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 
[FN187]. Abercrombie & Fitch, Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976). Ever-
vigilant and ever-imaginative in finding new uses for both new and old laws, corporate authors have 
now tried to use the Anticybersquatting Act as a weapon against gripe sites, which have heretofore 
enjoyed a safe harbor because they are not considered "commercial." See supra text 
accompanying notes 137-41. The gripe site verizonreallysucks.com, named for Verizon, then a new 
wireless communications service engineered by Bell Atlantic, received a demand letter from Bell 
Atlantic's Chief Intellectual Property Counsel. Although, as the letter points out, "On behalf of Bell 
Atlantic, its agents have registered hundreds of domain names incorporating 'Verizon' and 
variations thereof," the agents apparently missed verizonreallysucks.com. Asserting that, in its short 
life, Verizon has become a "famous" trademark, the letter accuses verizonreallysucks.com of 
"trademark infringement, unfair competition and dilution"--the standard litany of corporate 
complaints against dissident domains. "Moreover," the letter adds, registration of the name "violates 
the new Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, [which] expressly prohibits the registration of 
a domain name confusingly similar to or dilutive of a mark [and] makes illegal the bad faith 
misappropriation of trademarks as domain names." Letter from Sarah B. Deutsch, Vice President 
and Chief Intellectual Property Counsel for Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. to Emanual 
Goldstein (May 5, 2000), available at http:// www.2600.com/news/2000/0508.html. This letter raised 
a flurry of criticism on the International Trademark Association chatroom, whose members are 
usually most sympathetic to the assertions of trademark owners. It has also prompted the registrant 
of verizonreallysucks.com to register a domain name that "uses the new 63 character maximum 
length name": VerizonShouldSpendMoreTimeFixingItsNetwo. Id. 
[FN188]. Lemley, supra note 29, at 898 ("Intellectual property law is expanding on an almost daily 
basis as new rights are created or existing rights are applied to give intellectual property owners 
rights that they never would have had in an earlier time"). 
[FN189]. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1997). 
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[FN190]. Di Mari Ricker, Studios v. Celebrities in a Profitable Name Game, available at 
www.callaw.com/weekly/glitz/glitzy08.html. The Recorder/Cal Law, Nov. 8, 1999. 
 
[FN191]. Id. Within a month of the Act's passage, actor Brad Pitt sued a cybersquatter for 
registering maddpitt.com. Pitt v. Alzorooni, No. 99-12626 GAF (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 2, 1999). In 
addition to the Anticybersquatting Act, celebrities found a new ally under the Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN). In recent cases, Madonna, Dan Marino, and Jethro Tull have recaptured domain names 
from cybersquatters, although Bruce Springsteen's and Sting's similar efforts failed. 
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains.decisions/html/2000. 
 
[FN192]. 15 U.S.C. §1125(d) (1997). 
[FN193]. See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'd, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(holding that the latest extension did not violate the constitutional requirement that copyrights 
endure for "limited times."). 
[FN194]. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 
(1998). The role of the eponymous Sonny Bono in the intellectual property life of this country awaits 
full appreciation. Perhaps the essence of a late-twentieth-century celebrity, Bono could neither sing 
nor act nor play music, yet he became a hit recording artist and TV star who rode his celebrity to 
become mayor of Palm Springs, California, and a member of Congress. As a Congressman, he was 
a powerful member of the House Judiciary Committee's subcommittee on intellectual property and 
was instrumental in the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995. At the hearings on 
the Bill he expressed outrage that such famous American trademarks as Samsonite and Reebok 
could find themselves "ripped off" by foreign imitators after they had expended great sums in 
establishing their famous names. Madrid Protocol Implementation Act and Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1270 and H.R. 1295 Before the Subcommittee of Courts and 
Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 121 (July19, 1995).  
Bono died in a skiing accident in January 1998. His fellow Congressmen named the Copyright Term 
Extension Act after him, apparently undeterred at the irony of prolonging the copyright term in the 
name of a colleague whose own term was cut short. The issue of whether Congress could 
legitimately exploit Sonny Bono's celebrity by naming a Bill after him seems not to have arisen. This 
was, after all, not a "commercial" use of his name. Further, Bono's widow, who was elected to his 
seat in Congress, may not have raised any objections. 
[FN195]. See Sophie Boukhari, A Virtual Library on the Web, UNESCO Courier, June 1, 1999, at 
43; see also Paul Lewis, The Artist's Friend Turned Enemy: A Backlash Against the Copyright, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 8, 2000, at B1 (noting that extending a dead author's copyright, like that protecting the 
image of Mickey Mouse, "won't encourage [the author] to write another book"). 
 
[FN196]. Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d, at 2. 
[FN197]. Boukhari, supra note 195. 
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[FN198]. The No Electronic Theft ("NET") Act, Pub. L. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997), imposes 
criminal penalties for willful infringements of copyright either for commercial advantage or with a 
certain value or frequency. The Act, intended to combat digital piracy" and heavily lobbied for by the 
software industry, was recently stiffened by raising some of its penalties fifty percent. Pub. L. No. 
106-160, H.R. 3456 (1999). 
[FN199]. Lawrence Lessig, Reclaiming a Commons, Keynote Address at The Berkman Center's 
Building A Digital Commons (May 20, 1999), at http:// www.cyber.law.harvard.edu. 
 
[FN200]. Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal 1996), aff'd, 141 F.3d. 1316 
(9th Cir. 1998). 
[FN201]. See supra text accompanying notes 144-148. 
[FN202]. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l, Inc., No. 97-734-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359 
(E.D.Va. Feb. 2, 1998). 
[FN203]. Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D. Cal) aff'd, 162 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
 
[FN204]. The applicability of traditional legal theories and defenses to Internet-related litigation has 
been widely noted. See, e.g., Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence 
of Misappropriation and Other Common Law Theories of Protection for Intellectual Property, 11 
Harv. J.L. & Tech. 401 (1998); Bruce P. Keller & Peter Johnson, Are the "New" Cyberspace Legal 
Developments Really So New? LDRC Bull., 169, Dec. 16, 1999. 
[FN205]. "Vaudeville" has its roots in "Vau de Vire," the valley of the Vire River, which was a hotbed 
of satirical lyric rewrites in medieval times. For a discussion of Rabelais' satirical use of popular 
song lyrics, see Nan Cooke Carpenter, Rabelais and Music 22-45 (1954). 
 
[FN206]. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
[FN207]. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986). 
[FN208]. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964). 
 
[FN209]. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
521 U.S. 1146 (1997). 
[FN210]. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1377 (N.D. Ga.), vacated, 
252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001). 
[FN211]. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588 ("[T]he parody must be able to conjure up at least enough of 
that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable."). 
 
[FN212]. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 356 U.S. 43 (1958). 
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[FN213]. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439U.S. 1132 
(1978). 
 
[FN214]. 60 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 934 (1992). 
 
[FN215]. The court tipped its hand in its "Background Facts" section by describing photographer 
Rogers as a "professional artist-photographer, [who] has a studio and home at Point Reyes, 
California, where he makes his living by creating, exhibiting, publishing and otherwise making use of 
his rights in his photographic works." Koons, on the other hand, "worked at a number of jobs, 
principally membership development at the Museum of Modern Art in New York. While pursuing his 
career as an artist, he also worked until 1984 as a mutual funds salesman, a registered 
commodities salesman and broker, and a commodities futures broker.... A New York Times critic 
complained that 'Koons is pushing the relationship between art and money so far that everyone 
involved comes out looking slightly absurd." Rogers, 960 F.2d at 303-04. The court thus plumped 
for the "romantic" notion of authorship as embodied by Rogers. 
[FN216]. Id. at 310. 
[FN217]. M. Buskirk, Appropriation Under the Gun, 80 Art In Am. 37 (1992), quoted in Robert A. 
Gorman & Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright for the Nineties 609 (1993). 
[FN218]. Id. 
[FN219]. See supra text accompanying notes 158-160. 
[FN220]. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10. Although the Star Trek recodifications went 
unchallenged in pre-Web days, the creation of an authorized Star Trek website by Viacom--owner of 
the Star Trek copyrights--led it to crack down on unauthorized uses of Star Trek materials on 
unofficial Star Trek Web sites. http://www.off-hg.org/viacom.html (visited July 11, 2001). Other 
corporate owners have staged similar web crackdowns on recordings they tolerated off-line. See 
Coombe & Herman, supra note 29, at 602-03. ("Barbie Doll Benson, former nude Miss Canada, 
used the Barbie Doll stage name for sixteen years, but it was only when she produced a Web page 
that Mattel complained."). 
[FN221]. The Web too has created commodity/sign rumors. One, entitled "Barney Is Satan," took 
the phrase "Cute Purple Dinosaur," changed the u's to Roman v's, extracted the numerals CV, V, L, 
DI, and V, and added up their decimal equivalents to total 666, "the notorious Biblical number of the 
beast." Revelations 13:16-18. Garber, supra note 166, at 185 (citing http:// www.io.com/-
hitchken/barney.satan.html). 
 
[FN222]. Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway: A Survey of 917, 
410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million Times by 
Consumers in over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces, and Territories, 83 Geo. L.J. 1849 
(1995). 
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[FN223]. Mike Godwin, Fighting a Cyberporn Panic, in Cyber Rights 206 (1998); Johnson, supra 
note 156, at 224. ("Within a week of the study's publication, the Internet, the very medium 
purportedly studied, breathed a firestorm of flame messages, discrediting both the study and its 
author."). 
 
[FN224]. See, e.g., Esther Dyson, Communities, in Release 2.0, A Design for Living in the Digital 
Age 31 (1997). 
[FN225]. Thomas Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49 (1965). 
[FN226]. Id. at 101. 
[FN227]. See supra note 187. 
[FN228]. To give Coombe the last word:  
We are seeing a field of power shifting in digital terrain. As systems of univocal proprietary control 
give way to an interactive ethics that interrogates the claims of property with questions of propriety, 
we have a unique opportunity to challenge the impositions of privilege and insist upon new forms of 
responsibility and social accountability in digital environments.  
Coombe & Herman, supra note 29, at 632. 
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